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ABSTRACT 
A spccific deficit in Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities has been proposed to explain the 
distinct pattern of sociallcognitivc, dcricits in individuals with autism (Frith, 1989). 
Leslie and Frith (1988), Pcmcr, Frith, Leslie and Lcckharn (1989) and Baron-Colien 
and Goodhart (1994) have also indicated that children with autism have a specific 
difficulty in understanding the principle that "seeing leads to knowing". However, 
other studies designed to measure ToM abilities have reported weak mcntalising skills 
in individuals with developmental language disorders (Shields, Varicy, Broks and 
Simpson, 1996), dcaf people (Peterson and Siegal, 1995) and individuals with 
intellectual difficultics (Shulman and Pilowsky, 1996). This study was designed to 
examine the developmental and cognitive correlates of one aspect of ToM. A method 
derived from ONeill and Gopnik (199 1) %vas adapted and children with autism (n = 
17), children with intellectual difficulties of undifferentiated actiology (n = 19) and 
normally developing children (n = 21) were compared on their ability to understand 
the principle that "SEEING, FEELING and TELLING" lead to knowing. As 
predicted, individuals with autism (88%) and children with intellectual difficulties 
(63%) had difficulty identifying the role of informational access in knowledge, 
whereas the normally developing group did not (14%). Logistic regression analyses 
revealed that group membership and verbal mental age, when measured by the Test 
for Reception of Grammar (TROG; Bishop, 1983), were the best predictors of task 
performance. Discussion focuses on the implications of the findings and emphasises 
the need to carefully consider what tasks actually measure as well as the specific 
actiology of comparison groups when studying abilities and impain-nents of 
individuals with autism and intellectual difficulties. 
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POTENTIAL VALUE OF ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE 
The syndrome of autism is manifested in a variety of symptoms forming a specific triad 
of impairments in communication, imagination, and socialisation (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994; Wing and Gould, 1979). Proponents of the Theory of Mind (ToM) 
hypothesis have claimed that one of the primary dcl'icits in autism is a dcricicncy in the 
ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others (Baron-Colicn, Leslie and Frith, 
1985; Frith, 1989; Hobson, 1993,1990a, 1990b; Ilughcs and Russell, 1993; Leslie and 
Frith, 1988; Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers, 1991; Russell ct al., 1991). Within this 
theoretical framework the communication impairment can be understood as a problem in 
the semantics of mental states, the imagination impairment as a problem in attributing 
mental states that are contrary to reality, and the social impairment as an inability to 
understand the way in which mental states affect behaviour (Leslie, 1987). 
This project will extend work already completed on ToM; extending the existing 
knowledge base will provide further information to general discussions of how best to 
educate individuals with autism (Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin and Hill, 1996; Holroyd 
and Baron-Cohen, 1993; Jordan and Powell, 1995; Powell and Jordan, 1992). Popular 
sources of information on autism now include references to theory of mind studies 
(Autism Research International, 1996). Some teaching materials are even being marketed 
with reference to ToM (Gray, 1995). Therefore, hopefully adding to the existing 
knowledge base will enable development of a repertoire of curricular materials that target 
several dimensions of one specific problem. 
I"his is consolidated by Happe (1994) who suggested the appropriateness of using ToM 
research as a guiding principle in developing curricula for students with autism, given 
that this theory accounts for a variety of impairments across the social, communication 
and imagination triad used in diagnosing autism. 
Moreover, several intervention studies have found that children with autism can show 
improvements in their ability to understand beliefs and emotions (Swettenham, 1995; 
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Ozonoff and Miller, 199S; Hadwin, Baron-Cohcn, Ilowlin, and Hill, 1996). 
ldcntirication of dcricits in the area of knowledge and modality could be included in 
training packages spccifically designed to increase the ability to mind read as a valuable 
addition. 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Classification and charactcristics 
Autism is a pervasive dcvclopmcntal disordcr that is usually apparcnt from early 
childhood (Volkmar. Sticr and Cohen, 1985). It is charactcriscd by profound deficits in 
communication and social understanding and by ritualistic and obsessional bchaviours. 
The actual term "autistic" is derived from Blculcr (1908), who used the word to describe 
social withdrawal seen in adults with schizophrenia. Autism as a syndrome, however, 
%%-as first described by Kanner in 1943. He delineated four essential features: 
a) extreme isolation and an inability to relate to people; 
b) a pathological need for sameness; applying both to the individual's own behaviour and 
to the environment; 
c) mutism or non communicative speech; 
onset in the first two years of life. 
Many of Kanner's ideas remain essential to today's perspective of autism, however 
current views differ sharply with some of his observations. Kanner for example, created 
the psychogenic view perpetuated by later, %vriters such as Bcttleheim (1976), that cold 
emotionless parental behaviour caused the condition, referred to by Kanner as 
"refrigerator parenting". 
Approximately 10 per cent of autistic individuals have savant skills. This refers to an 
ability which is considered remarkable by most standards. These skills are often spatial in 
nature, such as special talents in music and art. Kanner however, founded the myth of 
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"latcnt genius" which has caused great distress for family members and teachers who 
have nearly always failed to unlock the alleged genius. I fowl in (1998) quoted research 
indicating that the majority (around 70-75 per cent) of individuals with autism have some 
associated Icarning disabilities and around 50 per cent have an IQ below 50. Those that 
have severe to profound cognitive impairments are unlikely to develop useful speech, and 
this group also tends to develop bchaviours such as self injury, and almost always require 
specialist education and lifc-long care. Approximately 20 pcr cent of those with autism 
have an IQ w-ithin the "normal" range, for them outcome is seen to be more variable. 
It is common for many of those with autism to respond in an unusual way to sensory 
stimuli, ovcr-rcacting to sounds and touch, or under-reacting to pain (Frith and Baron- 
Cohen, 1987). In addition, behaviour such as self stimulation and repetitive behaviours 
can extend for long pcriods and to the exclusion of other activities. Twirling, hand 
flapping, and rocking arc common, especially in institutional ised children. Furthermore, 
autistic children can be anxious and obsessive about keeping surroundings completely the 
same. Toys for example in many cases often have to be in the same place, similar to non- 
autistic children at two and a half years of age. This suggests that the development of 
autistic children may be stalled at this point (Murray, 1996). 
As with many individuals with learning disabilities, those with autism often have 
problems maintaining attention for long periods of time. Many autistic individuals also 
have a narrow or focused attention span, tcrmcd'stimulus over-sclectivity. ' Basically, 
their attention is focused on only one, often irrelevant, aspect of an object. For example, 
they may focus on the colour of a utensil, and ignore other aspects such as the shape. In 
this case, it may be difficult for a child to discriminate between a fork and a spoon if 
he/she attends only to the colour. Since attention is the first stage in processing 
information, failure to attend to the relevant aspects of an object or person may limit one's 
ability to learn about objects and people in one's environment (Dunlap et al., 1981). This 
attentional pattern has caused many parents to suspect hearing impairment in very young 
autistic children. Moreover, attcntional selectivity can augment existing social problems, 
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as appropriate responses to things one hears requires the excluding of irrelevant stimuli, 
and attendance to important details. 
Interestingly, people with autism generally show very little inclination to use their skills 
outside the circumstances in which they were learned. For example, an autistic child may 
learn to read in class but fail to check the sign on the door of a lavatory before entering. 
As a result, therapeutic emphasis has gradually shifted from the classroom to the 
community (Homer, Dunlap and Koegcl, 1988). 
In autism, almost all aspects of communication and language can be impaired, such as the 
use and understanding of smilcs, gestures and postures (Watson et al., 1989). Rutter 
(1978) pointed out that only about half of autistic individuals develop communicative 
speech. Even among those that do develop productive speech, prosody and pragmatics 
are likely to be severely impaired. Many of those with autism, and specifically those of 
lower intelligence, do not speak-, or only make unrecognisable noises, or may speak only 
on rare occasions, during temper outbursts for example. However, others can speak 
clearly but merely repeat what they have heard. This repetition (known as echolalia) is a 
normal stage in the early development of language which remains in many cases of those 
-kNith autism. Communication may be an initiation, a response, or an imitation, serving to 
express emotion, make a request or protest. Therefore the impact of this impairment can 
affect all facets of their life. 
It is commonly stated that people with autism are not motivated to engage in educational 
or treatment programmes. However, this paper argues that it would be more accurate to 
say that they are motivated by things that most people would find unusual or odd. Age 
appropriate toys for example, may not hold interest, whereas isolated, repetitive 
manipulation or fascination with parts of objects rather than their function (e. g. spinning 
the wheels of a toy car rather than pushing it about) may be of high priority. 
Consequently this identiflcs the need for systematic assessment to determine what is 
reinforcing (Green et al., 1988). 
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11rcvalence 
As definitions of autism have changed, so have the figurcs of prevalence of the disorder, 
illustrated by Fornbonne (1997) who found rates varying from 0.7 to 15.5 per 10,000. 
Further analysis indicated that although the average figure for "classic" autism appears to 
be around 5 per 10,000 the rates arc much higher (91 per 10,000) if children within the 
wider "autistic spectrum" arc included (Wing, 1996). 
Causation 
There are many %vays to understand how our minds develop and work and consequently 
there arc a myriad of ways of thinking about how a complex phenomenon like autism 
might begin. In recent years, methods of studying brains have advanced and have led 
many to pin their hopes for explaining and understanding autism on research into 
ncuronal systems in the brain (Trcvarthcn and Aitken, 1994). In addition, new genetic 
and molecular-biological theories that seem to explain how inherited factors control 
normal and abnormal building of the tissues and organs of the brain, offer a much more 
fundamental explanation (Trevarthen, Aitken, Papoudi and Robarts 1998). 
Most arguments regarding rival concepts revolve around the problem: is autism caused 
genetically or is it caused by an abnormal environment, either in the body or coming from 
stimuli and especially from the social world? However, regardless of which approach is 
taken, it should be remembered that autism is a condition that develops. Consequently, as 
with all developments in brain function, autism will be a result of interacting factors. 
These interacting factorswill come from within (that is, inside the genetic growth 
programme), and from the environment. After all, it is the environment that stimulates 
and transforms the brain as it grows and connections arc being established. 
Theory of Alind (ToNI) 
Many researchers have taken the view that social inadequacies are the fundamental 
problem in autism. Walters ct al. (1990), for example, reviewing studies on attachment, 
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rccognition of motions, play, social cognition, and ncurochcrnistry concludcd that 
Kp anncr was corrcct in asscrting: 
"'that social-affectivc dcricits or deviations lic at the root of this 
disordce'(p. 320). 
As Grandin (1992) noted, even among those who make the greatest progress, their 
communication and social problems continue to affect many aspects of their lives. 
Autism is currently derincd at the behavioural level, on the basis of impairments in 
socialisation, communication, and imagination, %vith stereotyped repetitive interests 
taking the place of creative play (DSM IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994 - 
refer Appendix I). Psychological accounts of autism seek to explain this set of co- 
occurring symptoms in terms of underlying cognitive features. Wing and Gould (1979) 
proposed an association between deficits recognised in socialisation, communication and 
imagination. 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) suggested that the triad of impairments identified 
by Wing and Gould result from autistic individuals lacking a 'Theory of Mind' (ToM). 
Ifere individuals are viewed as being impaired in their ability to understand mental states. 
This ToM refcrs to the ability to attribute mental states to the self and others. The ability 
to know about minds is required for many human interactions; it is necessary for 
understanding, explaining, predicting and manipulating the behaviours of others. 
According to Wellman (1993) this involves two components: the ontological aspect, that 
is the ability to distinguish between the real and the mental world, and the causal aspect, 
that is the ability to understand mutual causal relations between mental states and the 
physical behavioural world. 
The acquisition of ToM abilities in non developmentally delayed children is viewed as 
one of the major developmental achievements of the first few years of life (Yin-niya, Erel, 
Shaked and Solomonica-Levi, 1998). Although there is some variation concerning the 
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cxact agc at which ToM is acquircd most agrcc that it is in placc around thrcc to four 
ycars. 
Proponents of the ToM hypothesis of autism suggest that the communication impairment 
can be understood as a problem in the semantics of mcntal states, the imagination 
impainncnt as a problem in attributing mcntal states that are contrary to reality, and the 
social impairment as an inability to understand theway in which mcntal states affect 
behaviour. As a result, individuals with autism do not understand social situations and 
intcract inappropriately (Leslie, 1987). 
If ToM is dysfunctional in childrcn, %vith autism, then it has been argued that they should 
have difficulty understanding the cpistemic mental state of belief. Dennct (1978b) argued 
that the best %vay to test a child's understanding of belief is to investigate if someone 
could hold a false-belid. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) designed a task to 
comparc the ability of children with autism, children with Down's syndrome and non 
developmentally delayed children to recognise a character's false belief in the "Sally- 
Ann" task. Here the child sees a doll (Sally) hide a marble in her basket and leave the 
room, after which another doll (Ann) moves the marble to her own box. The child is then 
asked where Sally will look for the marble. The researchers found that 80 per cent of 
autistic participants did not answer correctly. That is, they would respond that Sally 
, would look in the box where the marble really was. This %vas in contrast to most 
"normally-developing74 year olds and 86 per cent of a group of children with Down's 
syndrome, who correctly replied that Sally would look in the basket where she mistakenly 
believed the marble would be. This and other findings were taken as evidence for an 
autism-specific deficit in thinking about thoughts. 
Seeing and knowing 
As already suggested, the a%N-areness of where knowledge comes from is viewed as vital 
for a normally functioning ToXf. Gopnik and Graf (1988) stated that when people fon-n a 
new belief about the world, they understand and often remember how they got that belief. 
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They usually know whether it is based on what someone told them, on an inference they 
made, or on something they saw with their own eyes. Being able to take account of 
mcntal states in self and others, and to understand that knowledge of an object may be 
gained by looking at it, arc significant accomplishments and form the basis of much 
social interaction (Pratt and Bryant, 1990), thereby constituting a fundamental aspect of 
mind. Although we do not have a complete causal account of how our experiences lead 
to our current representation of the world, we do know that events such as perception, 
communication and inference can lead to beliefs, and much of the time we can identify 
which particular type of event led to a belief. Nisbett and Ross (1980) suggested that 
failure to consider the sources of knowledge may result in false impressions, 
interpretations, and beliefs that may have serious consequences. 
A numbcr of studies such as Pillow (1989) and Pratt and Bryant (1990) suggcstcd that 
children develop causal accounts of the origins of beliefs between the ages of 3 and 6 
years. These experiments have focused on understanding that visual perception leads to 
knowledge. Further research such as O'Neill and Gopnik (1991) has examined the ability 
of non developmentally delayed children to identify the sources of their beliefs using 3 
modalities: touching, seeing and feeling. Again, they noted that this ability usually 
developed between the ages of 4 and 5 years. 
Leslie and Frith (1988) found that onlY 44 per cent (Perner, Frith, Leslie and Lcckham, 
1989, found that only 35 per cent) of children they tested with autism could understand 
the role of visual access in knowledge formation. Baron-Cohen and Goodhart extended 
this research in 1994 by including a control group with learning disabilities. They found 
that 75 per cent of those %%ith learning disabilities could pass this test compared to only 33 
per cent of those with autism. They saw this ability as a "cornerstone principle of a theory 
of mind"' (p. 397). 
Moderating factors 
However, considerable variance has been found in the proportion of children with autism 
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who pass ToM tasks. Mcta-analyscs conducted by Ilappe (1995) found proportions 
passing standard first-ordcr ToM tasks varied from 15 per cent to 60 per cent. In some 
studies task performance was found to improve with higher chronological age (CA) 
(Baron-Cohcn, 1991; Leslie and Frith, 1988), in others higher mcntal age (MA) or better 
linguistic skills (Eiscnmajcr and Prior, 1991; Lcckham and Pcmcr, 1991) and in yet 
another study with both higher CA and verbal mcntal age (VMA) (Prior, Dahlstrom and 
Squires, 1990). 
Possible explanations for this variation in performance are poor test-retest reliability of 
ToM tasks (Mayes, Klin, Tcrcyak, Cicchetti, and Cohen, 1996) and the influence of 
developmental cognitive factors in dctcnnining social cognitive ability, in addition to or 
above diagnostic group status (Buitclaar, van der Wces, Swaab-Bamveld, van der Gaag, 
1999). Furthermore, Buitelaar, van der Wees, S%%-aab-Bamvcld and van der Gaag 
suggested that divergent findings may be due to using a single task such as the British 
picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn. Whetton and Pintilie, 1982) in many 
studies to measure verbal ability, and the failure to control for non-verbal mental skills in 
studies examining the influence of verbal ability. 
In addition, the actiology of the individuals comprising the leaming disabled group are 
important, as the specific characteristics of any given comparison group may relate to the 
results and interpretation of any single study (Prior, Dahlstrom and Squires, 1990). 
Individuals with Down's syndrome, for example, are known to have higher empathic 
abilities and better social skills compared to other individuals with leaming disabilities of 
unknown actiology (Beeghly, Weiss-Perry, and Cicchetti, 1990; Kasari, Mundy, Yirmiya, 
and Sigman, 1990). Therefore, differences between individuals with Down's syndrome 
and autism in ToM abilities may indicate a specific strength of those %vith Down's 
syndrome and not a deficit in those with autism. Moreover, recent reports indicate that 
individuals with a learning disability of undifferentiated actiology may also show deficits 
in ToM abilities compared to normally developing individuals (Benson ct al., 1993, 
Yirmiya, Solomonica-Lcvi, and Shulman, 1996; Yirmiya, Solomonica-Lcvi, and Shulman 
and Pilowsky, 1996). 
Extending the research 
The aim of this research project is to replicate and extend previous findings to determine 
whether ToM is a cross modal deficit for those with autism. In addition, this research 
will identify if ToM deficits arc specific to autism. To do this a similar methodology to 
O'Neill and Gopnik (199 1) will be adopted with the inclusion of an autistic group and 
mental age equivalent learning disabled group of undifferentiated actiology. 
Given the possible cffect of cognitive and developmental factors on ToM ability, this 
project also aims to investigate the impact of VMA and CA for all three groups. 
HYPOTHESES 
On the basis of the literature it is hypothesised that individuals with autism will perform 
less well than normally developing children or individuals with learning disabilities on 
ToM tasks regardless of modality. 
RECRUITMENT OF PARTICIPANTS 
There will be 3 groups of participants: 
1. Those with a recognised diagnosis of autism (e. g. DSM-lV see Appendix 1). 
2. Thosexvith a learning disability of undifferentiated aetiology. 
3. Those from a mainstream school, not developmentally delayed; without a Special 
Educational Needs statement or going through the statementing process. 
Power Analysis was used to determine the number of participants required to show a 
"real" experimental effect. Therefore, using the Baron-Cohen and Goodhart (1994) study 
where they compared the proportion of children with autism Vs children with disabilities 
who passed an experimental task (3 per cent Vs 75 per cent pass rate respectively) a two- 
sample comparison of proportions (with equal group sizes), with alpha (p) set at 0.05, 
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bcta set at 0.2 (equivalent to 80 per cent power) %N-as conducted. Assuming a2 tailcd test, 
would require 21 cases per group to find this difference in proportions. 
The autistic population will be recruited from the 
. The Educational Psychologist based at the has agrccd to contact 
parents of children attending their centre with a diagnosis of autism to determine if they 
would be interested in taking part in this research project. Information and consent 
documents (refer Appendix 11) will be forwarded to those parents giving details of the 
rescarch and what it would involvc, including the opportunity to contact the rescarchcr for 
further infonnation. 
Those clients with leaming disabilities but not autism will be recruited from a local 
school for children with moderate learning difficulties. The head teacher of 
School in has agreed to contact parents to determine if they would also be 
interested in taking part in this research project. Again, the information document will be 
forwarded giving further information. Likewise, the head teacher of a mainstream 
primary school in has agreed to contact parents in a similar manner. 
inclusion criteria 
Inclusion criteria will be based on an attempt to match participants used in previous 
experiments (such as Baron-Cohen and Goodhart, 1994). Therefore, only participants 
meeting the full set of criteria of autistic disorder from DSM-IV or based on the Autism 
Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, and Le Couteur, 1994) will be 
included. In addition, all children will be characterised by their scores on the Childhood 
Autism Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler, Reichler, Dcvellis, and Daly, 1980), to ensure 
that individuals from the autistic group are in fact autistic, and that those with learning 
disabilities do not meet the criterion for autism. 
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Participants will also bc asscsscd to cnsurc flicy rcachcd inclusion critcrion of a vcrbal 
mcntal age between 4 and 8 years; measured by the BPVS and Test for Reception of 
Gmmmar (TROG; Bishop, 1983). 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
A mixed quasi-experimcntal design will be employed; having both a bctwccn-partic i pants 
component (Autism Vs LD Vs Control) and a withi n-partici pants component (modality of 
task). 
The inclusion screen described previously will be employed. Following this, three 
experimental tasks will be conducted: 
Task (1): A prc-tcst, control condition. 
Task (2): To determine another's knowledge and identify its source. 
Task (3): Identifying and differentiating the various component activities of seeing, 
feeling and listening. 
PROCEDURES EMPLOYED 
The participants Nvill be screened by the investigator individually in a room without 
distractions at the schools concerned prior to the experimental tasks. For both screening 
and experimental testing the participant and investigator will bc sat facing each other 
across a table. At no point %vill any comments be made regarding the correctness or 
otherwise of responses. 
TASK (1): prc-test control condition 
A pre-test task similar to that of Baron-Cohen and Goodhart (1994) will be administered 
to familiarise the participants with the general procedure of choosing one of the dolls and 
to eliminate participants who are unable to follow the simple procedure. First, the 
investigator will take out the two dolls and say to each participant: "This is John and 
this is Sally". The participant %%ill then be asked the naming question: "Which is John? 
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Which is Sally? " Next the participant will be shown each of the objects and asked to 
name them. If participants answer correctly the investigator will then say: "Let's give 
John the toothbrush and Sally a hall. " Having watched the investigator give each doll 
an object, the participant will then be asked: "Who has the toothbrush, John or Sally? " 
This last question constitutes a control condition to the main experiment, reported below, 
in comprising a story but entailing no knowledge formation. Six trials will be given to 
each participant, in which the object and order in which the dolls are mentioned will be 
randomised across trials. Rcsponscswill be marked on a recording form (refer appendix 
111). Again, participants will be required to answer correctly on at least five out of six 
trials, and therefore be permitted to participate in the second experimental task. 
TASK (2): To determine another's knowledge and identify the source of that 
knowledge 
The investigator will introduce the experimental task to the participant similar in nature to 
that of O'Neill and Gopnik (1991). They will begin by placing the tunnel on the table and 
saying: "This is my tunnel, you can lift up the material and look inside. But when 
the material is down you cannot see what is inside. Now we arc going to play a 
game. I am going to place things inside the tunnel and then I am going to ask you 
which of the dolls Sally or John knows what is inside the tunnel, and how they know 
what is inside? " The participants will then receive 15 experimental trials, 5 for each of 
the 3 types of source information (Seeing, Feeling and Listcning). 
In the Seeing trial one of the objects will be placed into the tunnel using the scarf so that 
the participant cannot see what it is. The investigator will then make one doll lift up the 
material and "look" inside, and the other doll walk around the tunnel looking at the 
outside. Each action will be accompanied by a statement such as, "John lifts up the flap 
and has a look inside. Sally walks around the tunnel and looks at the tunnel". The 
participant will then be asked "Who knows what is inside the tunnel John or Sally? " 
The child's response will then be marked on the response sheet. 
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If the participant responds correctly to the identity of the doll they will then be asked the 
source question. This will first be done in the form of an open-ended question: I'llow do 
they know what is inside"? If the participant responds immediately, they will be scored 
as either correct or incorrect. If the participant does not respond immediately, the source 
question will be repeated and the participant presented with three forccd-choicc 
alternatives that specify the different possible sources of information (e. g., "Because they 
felt inside, because they saw what was inside or because they were told what was 
inside? "). The three alternatives will be presented separately and the participants 
required to respond "yes" or "no". The answers will be counted as correct if presented in 
the appropriate order. 
The Feeling trial will be much the same, except the investigator will make one of the 
dolls put a hand under the material and "feel" inside the tunnel, and the other doll lift up 
the tunnel and put it down again. Again each action will be followed by a statement such 
as: "Sally puts her hand inside the tunnel and takes it out again. John lifts up the 
tunnel and then puts it down again". 
The listening trial procedure will be the same, except the investigator whispers the 
identity of the object to one of the dolls, whereas the other doll Nvill be whispered the 
time. Again each action will be followed by a statement: "I am going to tell John what 
time it is. I am going to tell Sally what is inside the tunnel". 
On each of the trials the order of the doll who looks, feels or is told, versus the other 
actions of lifting up the tunnel etc., and the order in which the two dolls are mentioned in 
the question w-ill be randomised. Furthennore, the order of the forced choice alternatives 
will be counterbalanced. This means that the participant will remain ignorant of the 
contents of the tunnel, and therefore have to answer the questions purely on the basis of 
what can be ascribed to another character. 
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Participants will receive a score between 0-15 for the naming question and three scores 
each between 0-5 for the source question (either in open-ended or forced choice form). 
TASK (3): Identifying and differentiating the various component activities of seeing, 
feeling and listening 
The materials for this task will be identical to those described earlier. Aficr completing 
the previous task the participants will be asked if they would help John to play a game, by 
helping him to find out what is inside the tunnel. The investigator will then place one of 
the covered objects into the tunnel. After this the participant will be told: "John wants 
to know what is inside the tunnel". This will be followed by one of three questions: 
"Can you help John to see what is inside the tunnel? " "Can you help John to feel 
what is inside the tunnel? ", or "Can you tell John what is inside the tunnel? " The 
procedure will be repeated so that each question is asked twice, there being six trials in 
total. The order of the questions will again be counterbalanced. The individual will be 
scored as correct if. 
(i) in the "see case, " they lift up the tunnel or let John look under the material flaps. 
(ii) in the "feel case, " they put John's hand inside the tunnel. 
(iii) in the "listening case, " they tell John the identity of the object in the tunnel. 
The whole procedure will be repeated until all participants have completed the tasks. A 
score between 0-6 will then be allocated to each individual. 
MEASURES 
The Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, and Le Couteur, 
1994) 
T'he ADI-R will be used as a screening measure for autism. 'ne ADI-R is commonly 
used in both clinical and research settings for performing standardised investigator based 
assessments (Fombonne, 1992). The ADI-R is a semi-structured, standardised diagnostic 
interview that includes questions relevant to past and current functioning. An ADI-R 
diagnosis of autism is conferred on the basis of an algorithm that is scored on three 
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dimensional clusters of items: qualitative impairments in recil)rocal and social 
interaction (Dimension B), impairments in verbal and non verbal co"ununication 
(Dimension C), andrepelitive behaviours andstereotýpedpatterns (Dimension D). The 
algorithm specifics that a child must reach cut-off scores of 10 on Dimension B, a verbal 
score of 8 or a non-vcrbal score of 7 on Dimension C (verbal scores arc only used for 
participants with a sufficient overall level of language), a score of 3 on Dimension D, and 
show evidence of abnormality before age 36 months, to receive an ADI-R diagnosis of 
autism. The ADI-R was validated against ICD-10 criteria by psychiatrists' blind ratings 
of 32 videotapes of unstructured interviews with mothers of autistic and non autistic 
mentally handicapped children aged 7-19 years, matched for IQ. Intcr-ratcr agreement 
was 81-89 per cent (Trevarthen, Aitken, Papoudi and Robarts, 1996). A study by Cox, 
Charman, Baron-Cohen, Drew, Klein, Baird, Swettenham and Wheel%vright (1999) found 
the ADI-R had good stability for detecting childhood autism. 
The Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler, Reichler, Devellis, and Daly, 
1980) 
All children will additionally be characterised by their scores on the CARS. The CARS 
was intended to broaden the classic conceptual isation of autism by including Kanner's 
criteria (1943), the nine diagnostic points of Creak (1964) and the National Autistic 
Society's definition. It consists of 15 scales, which are: impairment in human 
relationships, imitation, inappropriate affect, bizarre use of body movement and 
persistence of stereotypes, peculiarities in relating to non-human objects, resistance to 
environmental change, peculiarities of visual responsiveness, peculiarities of auditory 
responsiveness, near receptor responsiveness, anxiety reaction, verbal communication, 
non verbal communication, activity level, intellectual functioning and general 
impressions. There is a continuum of 7 scores for each of the above 15 scales, ranging 
from normal to severe abnormal behaviour. The rating depends on the child's age and the 
peculiarity, frequency and intensity of each behaviour. The development of CARS is 
based on direct observations of the children's behaviour rather than on a theoretical basis. 
The test was constructed on assessment of 537 children, who were distinguished into 
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three categories: non autistic, mild to moderate autistic and severe autistic. The CARS is 
highly reliable and has good validity (Trevarthen, Aitken, Papoudi and Robarts, 1996). 
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton and Pintilic, 
1982) 
The BPVS provides a measure of verbal mental age, specifically of single word receptive 
vocabulary. It consists of 150 picture plates each with four pictures. There is one plate 
for each of the 150 words of the two equivalent word lists, arranged in order of difficulty. 
The child is shown a card with four line drawings on it and asked to point to one specified 
picture. Children can point or indicate by eye movements if physically disabled. The test 
covers the age range 2 years to 18 years II months, as such the BPVS spans both very 
low age ranges and levels of intellectual functioning and levels considerably above 
average adult ability. The test was standardised on 3,334 children (Berger and Yule, 
1992). 
The Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG; Bishop, 1983) 
The TROG will be used as Buitelaar, van der Wees, Swaab-Bamveld, van der Gaag 
(1999) suggested the limitations of using a single task such as the BPVS to measure' 
verbal ability, therefore allowing the possibility that type of test for evaluating VMA 
moderates ToM abilities to be examined. The BPVS is a multiple choice sentence picture 
matching test. This examines comprehension of syntax and is held to be a more 
conservative test of language comprehension than the BPVS, while employing a similar 
choice format (Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant and Walker, 1995). 
Toy Tunnel 
A "tunnel" approximately 3 10 x 320 x 160 mm will be constructed and covered with felt. 
Both openings will be covered by felt flaps. Two dolls will be used, each approximately 
39 cm tall, with one male (John) with short black hair, and the other female (Sally) with 
long blond hair. The objects used will be a toothbrush, a ball and a metal tea spoon. The 
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objects will be kept in a covered box, and when an object is transferred to the tunncl it 
will bc covcrcd by an opaquc scarf. 
Both verbal instructions and objects will be piloted and standardiscd in advance of the 
investigation. 
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE INVESTIGATOR TO USE MEASURES 
The investigator is a clinical psychology trainee in his second year of training and has 
experience of working with children and parents from all three groups both as a trainee 
and assistant. The trainee has had training in and used the BPVS, TROG, and CARS. 
VENUE FOR INVESTIGATION AND DURATION 
The venue for the investigation will be a quiet room within the child's school without 
distraction. The time period for the screening tasks (BPVS and TROG) will be 
approximately one hour. The experimental task should take approximately 35 minutes to 
complete. 
DURATION OF THE STUDY 
The data for the study will be collected over a maximum of six months. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
All names and other relevant details will be kept confidential. Data will be analysed 
using the computerised Statistical Package For The Social Sciences (SPSS). A series of 
one-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) [one between-participants factor, group, with 
three levels, autism, LD, control), using naming and source scores as dependent variables. 
To find specific between-group differences post hoc tests would be employed (for 
example Tuk-ey-B). A series of one-way Analyses of Co-Variance (ANCOVA) will also 
be conducted controlling for BPVS, TROG and CARS scores to detennine whether any 
between-group differences remain after controlling for these variables. In addition, to 
examine differences in responses to the three types of source question a 30 MANCOVA 
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will be conducted, with a bctween-participant factor (3 levels, autism, LD, control) and a 
within participants factor (3 levels, different type of source). This will allow examination 
of interaction cffects between group and source. Furthermore, a MANCOVA will be 
used to covary with BPVS and TROG scores. Finally a one-way ANOVA (and 
ANCOVA) will be used for the total score in task 3. 
POTENTIAL HAZARDS TO PARTICIPANTS/INVESTIGATORS 
it is possible that fatigue could occur, therefore, if a person is showing signs of serious 
fatigue the session will be stopped. 
POTENTIAL OFFENCE/DISTRESS TO PARTICIPANTS 
There should be no part of the procedure which is potentially offensive or distressing. 
However, should any participant appear in any way distressed or offended through the 
study it will be immediately stopped with that individual and support will be offered to 
participants if the need should arise. 
CONSENT, 
Following approval being gained from head teachers to contact parents, consent will be 
sought from the legal parents or guardians of participants (refer Appendix 11). 
INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS 
This is provided with the consent form (refer Appendix II). 
APPROVAL OF RELEVANT PROFESSIONALS 
Approval will be sought from head teachers and teachers prior to contacting parents. 
PAYMENT 
Taking part in the study will be on a purely voluntary basis and no payment will be 
available to either participants, their parents or schools involved. 
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EQUIPMENT 
The equipment required will be provided by the Lancashire Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology at Blackpool. 
FEEDBACK 
Following completion of the study all parents/guardians and teachers will be contacted by 
the researcher by post, to give feedback on the findings of the study and to answer any 
further questions that they may have. 
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APPENDIXI 
Diagnostic criteria for 299.00 Autistic Disorder 
A. A total of six (or more) items from (1), (2), and (3), with at least two from (1), and one each from (2) 
and (3). 
(1) qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following: 
a) marked impairments in the use of multiple non-verbal bchaviours such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial 
expression, body posture, and gestures to regulate social interaction. 
b) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level. 
c) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements with other people, (e. g., by 
a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest to other people). 
d) lack of social or emotional reciprocity ( note: in the description, it gives the following as examples: not 
actively participating in simple social play or games, preferring solitary activities, or involving others in 
activities only as tools or "mechanical" aids). 
(2) qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at least one of the following: 
a) delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language (not accompanied by an attempt to 
compensate through alternative modes of communication such as gesture or mime). 
b) in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation 
with others. 
c) stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic language. 
d) lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play appropriate to developmental 
level. 
(3) restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and activities, as manifested by at 
least two of the following: 
a) encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest that is 
abnormal either in intensity or focus. 
b) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or rituals. 
c) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e. g. hand or finger flapping or twisting, or complex whole- 
body movements). 
d) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects. 
B. Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with onset prior to age 3 years: 
(I )social interaction. 
(2) language as used in social communication. 
(3) symbolic or imaginative play. 
C. The disturbance is not better accounted for by Rett's Disorder or childhood Disintegrative Disorder. 
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APPENDIX 11 
INFORMATION SHEET 
Dear Parent/Guardian 
My name is Gerrard Burrell-Hodgson, I am in my second year of training to become a 
Doctor of Clinical Psychology, currently based at 
I am conducting a research project as part of my Doctoral Training. 
WHAT IS THE RESEARCH PROJECT ABOUT? 
This research is designed to investigate how the thought processes of people with autism 
are affected. This attempts to explain some of the social and communication difficulties 
experienced by those who have autism. 
WHO WILL BE TAKING PART? 
All participants in this project will be aged between 4-18 years, will either have a 
diagnosis of autism, have learning difficulties but not autism or not be developmentally 
delayed. Participation is ENTIRELY VOLUNTARY, and choosing not to take part will 
in no way affect the quality of service your child is receiving at school. Also, if you 
decide at first that you would like to take part, but then change your mind later, you will 
be free to withdraw from the study at any time, without giving reason. 
WHAT WILL IT INVOLVE FOR MY CHILD? 
The children will be required to complete some tasks examining their understanding of 
verbal instructions. Following this they will take part in a brief experiment observing two 
dolls and answering a number of questions relating to what the doll knows. 
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WHO CAN I ASK FOR MORE INFORMATION? 
if you have any questions about this research- and what it involves, and what the point of 
it is, please do contact me: 
telephone (Dept of Clinical Psychology Training). 
or (Dept of Clinical Psychology - 
would like to add that all information gathered during this study will be treated in the 
strictest confidence, and participation will be completely anonymous. If you agree to 
your child participating in the study please complete the form attached. 
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APPENDIX III 
PARENTAL/GUARDIAN CONSENT FORM 
(To be signed by the child's parent or legal guardian) 
PLEASE DELETE AS NECESSARY 
Have you read the Information Sheet? YES/NO 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this YES/NO 
study? 
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions? YES/NO 
Have you received enough information about the study? YES/NO 
Do you understand that you do not need to take part in the study and if you do enter 
you are free to withdraw: 
at any time 
without having to give a reason for withdrawing 
and without affecting the service your child receives at school. YES/NO 
Do you agree to your child taking part in this study? YES/NO 
* .................................................................................................................. 
000.0.0.00*0 
(PRINT CHILD'S NAME IN 13LOCK LETTERS) 
Signed: ....................................................................................... 
Date: ............................. 
0-0 ..................................................................................................................... 0 0.0 
(PARENT/GUARDIAN NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) 
Please return the completed form to vour child's teacherjItank vou 
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APPENDIXIV 
Score Sheet 
Name Age 
School Af ) LD( ) NIS VI%IA: -TROG BPVS 
Pre-test 1. John has the object. Response \ Sally 
2. Sally has the object. Rrvponve John \ Sally 
3. Sally has the objcct. Respon ve John \ Sally 
4. John has the object. Rexponve John \ Sally 
5. Sally has th objcct. Response John \ Sally 
6. John has the object. Responve John \Sally 
John Seeing 
I A. Ulio knows what is inside the tunnel? _ 
I A. Response John \ SaIly__I 
I B. 1 low do they know what is inside? I B. Response 
I C. Do they know what is inside because: a. they felt inside? I C. Rexponse Ves \ No 
b. they saw what was inside? I C. Response Ves \ No 
c. I told them what was inside? I C. Response Ves \ No 
Sally Feeling 
2A. Who knows what is inside the tunnel? 2A. Res ponse John \S "I 
213.1 low do they know what is inside? 2B. Response 
2CDo they know what is inside because: a. they saw what was inside? 2C. Response Ves \ No 
b. they felt inside? 2C. Response Ves \ No 
c. I told them what was inside? 2C. Response Ves \ No 
John Told 
3A. Who knows what is inside the tunnel? 3A. Response John \ Sally 
3 B. 1 low do they know what is inside? 3B. Response 
3C-Do they know what is inside because: a. I told them what was inside? 3C. Response, Yes\ No 
b. they saw %hat was inside? 3C. Response Yes \ No 
C. they felt inside? 3C. Response Yes \ No 
Sally Feeling 
4A. %%`ho knows what is inside the tunnel? 
- 
4A. Response John \ Sa 
ow what is inside? 413.1 low do they kii 4B. Response 
4C. Do they know what is inside because: a. they saw what was inside? 4C. Response Yes \ No 
b. I told them what was insid7? 4C. Response Yes \ No 
c. they felt inside? 41C. Response Ves \ No 
Sall Seeing 
5A. Who knows what is inside the tunnel? 5A. Response John \ Sally 
5B. Ilow do they know what is inside? 513-Response 
SC-Do they know what is inside because: a. they felt inside? 5C. Response Ves \ No 
b. I told them what was inside3 5C. Response Ves \ No 
C. they saw what was inside? 5C. Response Ves \ No 
John Told 
- 6A. Who kn; ws what is inside the tunnel? 6A. Response John \ Sal-ly 
1 
6B. Ifow do thcv know what is inside? _6B. 
Response 
6r-Do thCY know what is inside because: a. they saw what was inside? 6C. Response Yes \ No 
b. they felt inside? 6C. Response Ves \ No 
c. I told them what was inside? 6C. Response Ves \ No 
John Seeing 
ows nhat is inside the tunnel? 7A. Who kn 7A. Response John \ Sally 
l 7ELIlow do they know what is inside? 71R. Response 
7C Do they know vhat is inside because: a. I told them what was inside? 7C. Response Yes \ No 
b. they saw what was inside? 
I 
7C. Response Ves \ No 
c. they felt inside? 7C. Response Ves \ No 
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Sally Feeling 
BA. %Vho knows what is inside the tunnel? 8A. Response John % Sa!! Z 
813.11 low do they know what is inside? 813. Response 
8CDo, they know what is inside because: a. they 
7elt inside? 
b. they saw what was inside? 
c. I told them what was inside? 
Sally_Told : I_ 
9A-%klhn knows %vhat is inside the tunnel? I 9A. Response John % Sallv 
10A. Response John I Sally 
IOB. Re. vppnse 
a. I told them what was inside? 
b. they fclt inside? 
c. they saw what was inside? 
IIA. Response John % Sally 
IIB. Response 
a. thcy felt inside? 
b. I told them what was inside? 
C. thcy saw what was inside? 
12A. Response John I Sally 
12B. Response 
a. they saw what was inside? 
b. I told them what was inside? 
c. thev felt inside? 
9B. 1 low do they know mhat is inside? 
_ 
9B. Response 
L9CDo they know what is inside because: a. they saw what was inside? 9C. Response Ves \ No 
b. they fclt inside? 9C. Raponse Ves \ No 
c. I told them what was inside? 9C. Response Ves\ No 
John Feeling 
I OA. Who knows what is inside the 
tunnel? 
10B. Ilow do they know what is inside? 
I OC. Do they know what is inside 
IIA. Who knows what is inside the 
tunnel? 
IIB. t low do they know what is inside? 
II C-Do they know what is inside 
because: 
Sally Feeling 
12A. Wlio knows what is insidc the 
tunnel? 
12 B. 1 low do thcy know what is insidc? 
12C. Do thcy know m hat is insidc 
becausc: 
John Told 
13A. W'ho knows what is insidc the 
tunncl? 
13B. 1 low do thcy know %hat is inside? 
13C. Do they know what is insidc 
bccausc: 
sany neeing 
MAU knows %hat is inside the 
tunnel? 
14 B. 1 low do they know%% hat is inside? 
14C. Do they know uhat is inside 
because: 
10C. Response Ves % No 
I OC. Response Ves \ No 
IIC. Response Ves X No 
IIC. Response Ves X No 
IIC. Response Ves X No 
12CResponse 
12C. Response 
12C. Resi7onse 
es\No 
Ves % No 
13A. Response John % Sally 
a. I told them %hat was inside? 
b. they saw what was inside? 
c. thev felt inside? 
14A. Response John \ Sally 
14B. Response 
a. they felt inside? 
b. thev saw %hat %%-&s inside? 
c. I told them %khat %%as inside? 
13C. Response 
14CResponse 
I 
Ves No 
Ves No 
Ves No 
Ves No 
Ves No 
Ves No 
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Sally Told 
15A. Who knows what is inside the 
tunnel? 
15A. Response John % Sally 
15B. Ifow do they know what is inside? 115B. Response 
15C. Do they know %hat is inside 
because: 
a. they saw %hat was inside? 15CResponse Yes % No 
b. they fclt inside? 15C. Response Ves \ No 
c. I told them what was inside? 115C. Rrsponse Ves \ No 
Differentiation Task 
I D. Can y ou help John to see what is inside the tunnel? Response 
2D. Can y ou help John to feel what is inside the tunnel? Response 
3D. Can y ou tell John what is inside the tunnel? Response 
4D. Can y ou help John Feel what is inside the tunnel? Res ponse 
5D. Can y ou tell John what is inside the tunnel? esponse 
6D. Can y ou help John to see what is inside the tunnel? Response 
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APPENDIX V 
Childhood Autism Rating Scalc 
1-39 
Third Party material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
LETTER CONFIRINUNG ETHICAL APPROVAL 
Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
SECTION 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prepared in accordance with notes for contributors for: Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines 
2-1 
THEORY OF MIND IN AUTISM: A REVIEW 
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ABSTRACT 
A specific deficit in Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities has been proposed to explain the 
distinct pattem of social/cognitive deficits in autistic individuals (Frith, 1989). However, 
the specificity of deficits in autism are beginning to be disputed. This paper reviews the 
available literature on ToM in people with autism alongside relevant research using other 
client groups. Preliminary evidence, backed by evidence from other groups, has indicated 
that impairments in ToM should no longer be considered unique to autism. Less 
information is known regarding the understanding of informational access and knowledge 
in autism, although research has indicated a specific difficulty in understanding the 
principle that "seeing leads to knowing". It is suggested that further research is needed to 
examine if deficits on informational access tasks are unique to autism. Moreover, 
previous work needs to be extended to identify conditions under which performance on 
informational access tasks may vary, thereby gaining a clearer understanding of any 
potential moderating factors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder that is usually apparent from carly 
childhood (Volkmar, Stier and Cohen, 1985). Autism is currently dcf*incd at the 
bchavioural Icvel, on the basis of impairmcnts in socialisation, communication, and 
imagination, with stereotyped repetitive interests taking the place of creative play (DSM 
IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). As definitions of autism have changed, so 
have the figures of prevalence of the disorder; studies reviewed by Fornbonnc (1997) 
report rates varying from 0.7 to 15.5 per 10,000. Further analysis indicated that although 
the average figure for "classic" autism appears to be around 5 per 10,000, rates are much 
higher (91 per 10,000) if children within the wider "autistic spectrua'are included 
(Wing, 1996). 
In the past five decades since Kanner (1943) first described the syndrome of autism, 
researchers have been trying to describe and conceptualise the syndrome and identify its 
underlying causes. A number of hypotheses have been offered and tested experimentally 
in an effort to account for the pattern of deficits in autism. Wing and Gould (1979), for 
example, proposed an association between the deficits recognised in socialisation, 
communication and imagination. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) suggested that 
the triad of impairments identified by Wing et a]. (1979) resulted from autistic individuals 
lacking a Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM refers to the ability to attribute mental states to 
the self and to others (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). The ability to know about minds is 
necessary to infer what others are thinking, believing and desiring in order to explain and 
predict their behaviour. According to Wellman (1993) this ability involves two 
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components: the ontological aspect, that is, the ability to distinguish between the real and 
the mental world; and the causal aspect, that is, the ability to understand mutual causal 
relations between mental states and the physical bchavioural world. 
The strength of the ToM hypothesis is that it is wcll placcd to explain many of the 
behavioural symptoms of autism. It is argued that social withdra%%ml is an understandable 
consequence of having ToM problems, that is, lacking the ability to explain otherwise 
confusing behaviour in tcnns of underlying mcntal states (Baron-Colicn, 1992). 
Similarly, one needs to understand that others have mental states that diffcr from one's 
own in order to be motivated to communicate (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). Finally, 
deficits in imagination or pretend play at least would occur as a result of a ToM deficit if 
pretend play requires the same representational processes as attributing bclicfs to othcrs. 
Leslie (1987) made exactly this argument, claiming that pretence, like the appreciation of 
beliefs, requires the representation of another's propositional attitude toward the state of 
the world. 
Tasks Designed to Afeasure ToAf 
Children %%ith autism, like normally developing threc-ycar olds, often fail on various tasks 
designed to assess the understanding of mcntal states, including picture sequencing 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and appearance reality (Baron-Cohcn, 1989; Perrier, Frith, 
Leslie and Lcekham, 1989). Researchers examining ToNt abilities have also frcqucntly 
examined false belief. The standard version of the false belief task presents the child with 
a character, Sally, who leaves a desirable object such as a chocolate in her basket, before 
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departing the scene. In her absence another character, Anne, removes the object and 
placcs it in a box. Childrcn are askcd to prcdict on Sally's rcturn whcrc Sally will look 
for the object. Children with autism have been shown to be significantly impaircd in their 
ability to pass such tasks in comparison to the pcrformancc of childrcn with Down's 
syndrome (Baron-Cohcn ct al., 1985), intclicctual difficulties (Baron-Colicn, 1989; Rccd 
and Pctcrson, 1990), motional disturbancc (Frith, Happc and Siddons, 1994) and spcciric 
language impairment (Leslie and Frith, 1988; Pcrncr ct al., 1989). Furthermore, the small 
number of individuals with autism who pass the task do not pass tasks requiring second- 
order mental attributions, in which they arc asked to predict the belief of onc agent 
concerning another agent's belief (Bowler, 1992). Failure at false belief tasks has 
therefore been considered to rcflcct some serious deficit in the individual's understanding 
of the mental lives of themselves and others. 
Is a Mentalising Deficit Universal and Specific to A utism? 
While most studies have demonstrated that the majority of participants %%ith autism fail 
ToM tasks, perfonnance has not bcen at floor. Variation in tcnns of the proportion of 
childrcn with autism failing ToM tasks has bccn as low as 10% (Dahlgrcn and 
Trillingsgaard, 1996) to 40% (Prior, Dahlestrom and Squircs, 1990) and as high as 85% 
(Reed and Peterson, 1990). Ilowcvcr, the finding that any child %%ith autism can pass 
ToM tasks has been seen by many as fatally damaging to the mentalising deficit theory of 
autism. If an inability to rcprescnt the bclicfs and dcsires of oflicrs and sclf, Icads to the 
triad of impairments which charactcrisc autism, how can it be that individuals exist who 
pass tests of mcntalising and yet are still autistic? Frith, Morton and Leslie (1991) argued 
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that although some people do pass ToM tasks, they do not in fact have the ability to 
mentalise. Rather, they suggest that these participants have found a task-spccific strategy 
allowing them to "hack out" a solution to these artificial tests, but which does not (unlike 
true ToM) gcncralise to real-lifc social solutions. 'Mcrc has been support for this 
argument in the literature and some studies using a variety of methods have taught 
autistic children to pass ToM tasks (Hadwin, Baron-Cohcn, Howlin and I lill, 1996; 
McGregor, Whiten and Blackbum, 1998; Starr and Bainc, 1993; Swcttcnham, 1996; 
NVhitcn, Irving and Mclntyrc, 1993). Howcvcr, although the majority of autistic childrcn 
, %vcrc successfully taught to pass tasks used in teaching, none of the approaches resulted in 
generalisation to those, tasks which had not bccn taught. It was concludcd that the 
children had passed the tasks by leaming relatively context-specific rules, but with no 
evidence of a simultaneous gain in conceptual understanding. 
17here have been further criticisms with the suggestion that ToM is an autism specific 
deficit (Baron-Cohen, 1989b; Happe, 1995). Sigman (1994) proposed that for a dcricit in 
ToM to be considered as primary or central to autism, it has to be univcrsal (that is, 
manifested in all or almost all individuals with autism) and it has to be unique (that is, not 
manifested by most individuals with other clinical diagnoses). Weak- mentalising skills 
have, however, been rcported in individuals with schizophrenia (Corcoran, Frith and 
Mercer, 1995; Frith and Corcoran, 1996) and in childrcn, %Nith profound pre-lingual 
deafness (Peterson and Siegal, 1995). Aside from the communication impairment 
associated with prclingual deafness, these children did not demonstrate autistic features. 
* Peterson etal. (1995) attributed the findingof impaired ToNt to the conversational 
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dcprivation and subscqucnt lack of cxposurc to convcrsations about mcntal statcs 
cxpericnccd by the childrcn in carly lifc. Othcr rcports indicatc that individuals with 
intclicctual difficultics of unknoun (non-speciflc) actiology also show dcricits in ToM in 
comparison to normallY devcloping individuals (Bcnson ct al., 1993, Yirmiya, 
Solomon ica-Lcvi, and Shulman and Pilowsky, 1996; Yirmiya, Solonionica-Lcvi, and 
Shulman, 1996). A mcta-analysis of ToM studics by Yirmiya, Ercl, Shakcd and 
Solornonica-Levi (1998) revealed that in the studies they cxamincd, all individuals with 
intellectual difficulties regardless of actiology pcrfonncd poorly on ToM tasks. 
Performance was not, however, as low as the autism group, although pcrfonnancc was 
particularly low for the group of unk-nox-, -n actiology in comparison to those with Do%,,, n's 
syndrome. Differences between individuals with Down's syndrome and those with 
autism on ToM tasks may in fact indicate a specift strength of those with Down's 
syndrome, and not a deficit in those with autism. This is supported by Beeghly, Weiss- 
perry and Cicchetti (1990) and Kasari, Mundy, Yinniya, and Sigman (1990), who both 
reported that individuals with Down's syndrome have been shown to have higher 
empathic abilities and better social skills, compared to other individuals %%rith intellectual 
difficulties of unkno%Nm actiology. These studies imply that the dericit in ToM is not 
unique to autism. What may be unique to autism is the severity of the impairment rather 
than the impairment itself 
Developmental and Cognitive Correlates 
Recent studies have indicated that the influence of developmental and cognitive factors in 
determining social cognitive ability, in addition to or above diagnostic group status, needs 
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tobccxamincd(Yimiiyactal., 1998). Both Baron-Cohcn (1992) and Lcslicctal. (1988) 
reported significant correlations between ToNI task perforniancc and chronological age 
(CA). Other stud ics by Charman and Baron-Cohcn (1992) and Ei scnmaj cr and Pri or 
(199 1), indicated significant correlations between performance on tasks and verbal mcntal 
age (VMA). Further research by Prior, Dahistrom and Squires (1990) reported a 
significant corrclation bet%vccn task pcrformance, VNIA and CA. Nlorcovcr, studics have 
failed to find such correlations between perfonnancc on ToM tasks and non-verbal 
intelligence measures (Happc, 1993). Boucher (1989) has also suggested that using the 
British Picturc Vocabulary Scalc (BPVS: Dunn, Dunn. %Vhctton and Pintilic, 1982) to 
assess VMA is problematic as it only tests recognition of single words. Wjjilc most 
individuals with autism have serious verbal communication difficultics, they do develop 
verbal knowledge of single words. It is plausible, thcreforc, that single word recognition 
is correlated differently Nvith other aspects of verbal and general ability for various 
clinical groups. 
Recently, studies have focused on specific areas of verbal ability that appear to link with 
ToNI development in children %vith autism. Tagcr-Flusbcrg (1992), for cxamplc, noted in 
a longitudinal study that childrcn, %vith autism wcrc diffcrentiated from thosc %Nith Down's 
syndrome on the basis that they rarely talked about attention and cognitive or cpistemic 
mental states. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995) compared children with autism to 
those with intellectual difficulties and normal development on ToNt and narrative tasks 
(requiring explanation of characters fccling states in a story). The children with autism 
were differentiated from the other two groups by poorer performance on both ToNt and 
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narrative tasks. Furthcr examination revealed a strong association between passing ToNI 
tasks and talking about the cognitive states of characters. This is supported by I lappC 
(1993) who demonstrated links between ToNI development and comprehension of simile, 
metaphor and irony. Childrcn with autism who failed first-ordcr ToNI tasks wcre able to 
comprchcnd similc but not mctaphor or irony which, I lappc argucd, rcquircd apprcciation 
of the spcak-cr"s intcnt and thcrcforc ToNt dcvclopincnt. I lo%%-cvcr. as I lappc and Frith 
(1995) statcd, although agc and %-crbal ability may bc ncccssary thcy are not sufficicrit to 
cnsurc succcss on ToNt tasks. It is tlicrcforc not the case. as has bccn suggcstcd, 
(Eiscnmajer ct al., 1991) that failurc is simply duc to lack of vcrbal ability. 111c agc and 
ability of the childrcn tcsted do, ho%%vver, secm to be at thc root of the slightly diffcrcnt 
proportions of participants found to pass in diffcrcnt studics. 
Problems with ToAl tasks 
Tasks such as the Sally-Ann test have bccomc important in the study of autism. 
Ilowcvcr, the failurc of young normally developing children and those with autism on 
ToNI tasks has created a great deal of debate. Some arguc that this finding illustrates the 
wcakness; of the task, as normally dc%-cloping thrcc-ycar olds arc nothing likc children 
with autism (Ilappc, 1996). 11=-ycar olds arc far superior with rcgard to 
communicativc and linguistic skills, the ability to pretcnd and understand prctcncc of 
others. Clearly, tasks designed to tap the ability to represent mcntal states also involvc 
othcr psychological abilitics such as languagc and rncrnory, and impairmcnt in any onc of 
thcsc arcas might Icad to task failurc which %%vuld not be a truc indication ora 
mcntalising dcricit. Typically dc%-cloping thrcc-year olds might fail the task bccausc of 
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gcncral task dcmands, bccausc tlicy do not havc a grasp orraisc bclicf, or both. Butilicy 
surely have a ToNI, in the general sense of having a sophisticated ability to reason about 
mcntal statcs; this is prcciscly %Nhy thcy diffcr from individuals with autism in the social, 
communicative and imaginative domains (Bloom and German, 2000). Russcll, 
Mauthncr, Sharpe and Tidswcll (1991) have argucd that difficultics on false belief tasks 
might rcsult from childrcn with autism having difriculty discngaging from the salience of 
the object. This theory finds some support in the work of Ozonofr, Pennington and 
Rogcrs (199 1) whcrc childrcn with autism show dcricits on cxccutivc function tasks. 
tlo%vcvcr, this cxplanation sccms unabic to cxplain why childrcn %kith autisnj can 
discngagc from the salient object in some tasks (e. g. Charman and Baron-Cohcn, 1991) 
but not othcrs. 
As Bloom ct al. (2000) stated, it is also important to rcalisc that passing such tasks does 
not neccssarily imply intact mcritalistic or social compctcncc in autism. This is supportcd 
by Happe (1994), who dcmonstratcd variation in autistic pcrformancc and rccogniscd that 
intact false belief task performance did not rule out severe handicaps in social 
undcrstanding and social intcraction in cvcryday lifc. Unfortunatcly, thcrc is an almost 
universal tendency to equate test performance %%ith underlying cognitivc ability, and whilc 
researchers are often keen to show that there are many reasons for failing a test, they 
rarcly considcr that thcrc may bc quitc as many %%ays of passing it. Ilappe(199S)argucd 
that task perfonnance should only be viewed as a distant measure of underlying 
competence. Therefore, any one task can be passed or failed for a number of different 
reasons - this is the distinction bct%N-cen the levels of cognition and of behaviour. 
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INFORMATIONAL ACCESS AND KNOWLEDGE 
Wimmcr, llogrcfc and Pcmcr (1988) suggcst that understanding infonnational acccss as a 
source of knowledge, also constitutes a fundamental aspect of our concept of mind. As 
Gopnik and Graf (1988) have indicated, knowing about the source of a belief plays a vital 
role in evaluating the belief, deciding how trustworthy orjustificd it is and how easily it 
should be discarded. If young children arc unable to identify or remember the sources of 
thcir belicfs it may bc difficult for tl1cm to make cvaluativcjudgcments, which potcntially 
havc scrious conscquenccs for thcir cognitivc dcvclopmcnt. Wc do not havc a cornplctc 
causal account of how our experiences lead to our current representation of tile world. 
Ho%%-cver, wc do know that evcnts such as pcrception, communication and infcrcncc can 
lead to beliefs. As Gopnik et al. (1988) suggest, when people fonn a new belief about the 
world, they understand and oflen remember how they got that belief Thcyusuallyknow 
whether it is based on what someone told them, on an inference they made, or on 
something they saw with their o%,, m eyes. This can be seen %Yhcn childrcnjustify their 
own knowledge by referring to the source of their knowledge, or when they start inquiring 
about the source of another person's knowledge (e. g. "'flow do you know? "). Such 
understanding is evident Nvhcn children correctly assess another person's knowledge, 
%vhen the other's knowledge can only be inferred from that person's exposure to an 
informational source. 
Age of Understanding 
Young children from at least 30 months of age appear to understand what might be called 
the "laws of vision", that is to see something, their eyes need to be open and their line of 
2-12 
rcgard nccds to bc unobstructcd (Lcnipcrs, Flavcll and Flavcll, 1977). Ilicrc havc bccn 
discrepancies in the exact age at which children understand inforniational access. In 
rcscarch by Wimmcr ct al. (1988) for cxanipic, ciiildrcn agcd bct%%-ccii thrcc and fivc. 
years old observed another child who cithcr had or did not have inrormational ncccss 
(either verbal or visual) to the contents ora box. Results suggcstcd that children up to the 
age of about four-ycars old did not understand the causal connection bct%vccn 
informational access and resulting knowledge. 11cy could not tell how they thcmsclvcs 
had acquired a particular piece of knowledge. Additionally, they %%vrc incapable of 
assessing another person's knowledge on the basis of observing that person being 
dcprived of, or bcing givcn infonnational acccss. 
Pratt and Bryant (1990) suggcstcd that the poor pcrformancc lcvcls of thrcc-ycar olds in 
Winuncr ct al. 's (1988) study, could be accountcd for by difficultics prcscnt in the vcrbal 
instructions. Therefore they simplified the experiment, using a simpic forccd-choice 
procedure. Children had then tojudge which of two assistants knew what was inside a 
box, when one of the assistants had looked inside, and the other liftcd it up. Pratt ct al. 
(1990) compared this simpler questioning format to one that, %%-as morc complex. I'licir 
findings indicated that the more complex format %%-as considerably more difficult with 
resulting poorer perfornlance. These results were taken to contradict tile conclusions of 
Wimmcr et al. (1988) in that childrcn agcd bctwccn thrcc-ycars cight-months and four- 
years seven-months did appear to understand that looking leads to kno%ving. llowcvcr, 
the mean age in Wimmcr ct al. 's (1988) study was thrcc-ycars sevcn-months compared to 
2-13 
four-ycars two-months in the Pratt ct al. (1990) study, which could account for sonic or 
the discrcpancics in the findings. 
O'Ncill and Gopnik (1991) cxtcndcd this rcscanh, invcstigating Young childrcn's ability 
to understand which experiences led to a belief across three modalities. Using a toy 
tunncl childrcn found out about its contcnts in thrcc diffcrcnt %Ntys: thcy sa%v, %vcrc told 
about, or felt the contcnts, of the tunncl. O'Ncill ct al. (1991) round that cvcn using a 
simplcr qucstion format thrcc-ycar olds (mcan a9c tllrcc-ycars six-months) had difficulty 
idcntifying the sourcc of thcir knowlcdgc, %vhcrcas four and fivc-ycar olds did not. 'llic 
results of the study arc consistent mith the results of Wimmcrct al. (1988). O'Ncillctal. 
(199 1) suggcsted that poorcr performancc on thcir tasks in comparison to Pratt and 
Bryant (1990),, %N-as due to the difficulty of relating the cvcnts and the beliefs to which 
they gave rise. In the Pratt et al. (1990) task this relation %vas very simple. 'Ibc cvcnt 
takes place or not, and the bclief is formed or not. O'Ncill ct al. s (1991) task involved a 
more complex relationship between experiences and belief. The child must rcalisc that 
there are several different paths that might lead from experiences to beliefs, and they must 
evaluate which path led to the belief in that particular case. A number of researchers have 
suggested that children might shift from a_simpIcr causal mode of belief fon-nation, to a 
more complex one in this developmental period (Astington and Gopnik, 1991; Flavcll, 
1988; Gopnik-, 1990; Pillow, 1989; NVcllman, 1990; Wimmcr, I locgrcfc and S(Oian, 
1988). Such a development might be responsible for these findings. In which case, thesc 
findings extend mther than contmdict the Pmtt ct al. (1990) results. 
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Moorc, Furrow. Chiasson and Patriquin (1994) round that usc of tcnns 'think' and 
'know', prcccdcd the ability to comprclicnd distinctions bctwccn the tcrrns at rour. ycars 
of agc. Thcy proposcd that production of tcmis occurrcd carlicr, as thcy do not rcquirc 
full ability to reprcscnt mcntal statcs. In which casc, rcrcrcncc to beliers to cxplain and 
prcdict action, could prcccdc the comprclicnsion of the distinction arnong the tcmis that 
would rcquirc, truc rcprcscntation of mcntal acts. Comprchension at this lcvcl would, 
thcrcforc, co-occur with the latcr dcvclopmcnt of a thcory of mind. 
Informational Access and Knowledge in Autisin 
Thus far, the rcscarch has postulated that a fundamental aspect ofTom is dcvcloping an 
undastanding of infonnational acccss as a sourcc of knowlcdgc. Morcova. givcn the 
proposed ToM dcricit in individuals %vith autism, it might be expected that they would 
also bc impaircd in thcir undustanding of infonnational acccss and kno%vlcdgc. Kazak-, 
Collis and LeNNis (cited in Ziatas, Durkin and Pratt, 1998) compared the ability of 
children %,, ith autism, Down's s)mdrome and normal development to report kno%%ing or 
guessing the location of a marble for themselves and for another. on the basis of seeing or 
not seeing. They found that children with autism classified as low VNIA (BPVS) %%-cre 
unlikely to use 'know' and 'guess' to reflect knowledge state, despite being able to judge 
accurately whether they and the other had or had not seen the placement. I lo%%-cvcr, those 
children classified as high VNIA were able to use 'know' and 'guess' to rcflcct their 
knowledge states. 
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A furthcr study by Ziatas ct al. (1998) cxamincd the rclationship betwcen the 
dcvclopmcnt of ToNI and undcrstanding the tcmis 'think", 'know' and 'gucss'. T"-clvc 
childrcn %vith autism wcrc individually matchcd (by scx, chronological and VNIA using 
BPVS and Tcst for Rcccption of Grammar- TROG; Bishop, 1983) with 12 childrcn with 
spccific languagc impairmcnt and (matching by scx and VNIA) 12 childrcn with nornial 
dcvclopment. Thcrc wcrc also 12 cllildrcn with Aspcrgcr syndronic, niatclicd (by scx, 
CA and VMA) to 12 childrcn, %%ith speciric languagc impairmcnt, (by scx and VNIA) and 
12 childrcn with nonnal, dcvclopmcnt. All participants complctcd a faisc bclicf task as 
wc1l as a bclicf tcrm comprchcnsion task, rcquiring childrcn to idcntify the location of a 
smartie on the basis of clucs given by two puppets. Ibc clucs contained contrasts of tile 
tcnns 'think', 'know' and 'gucss'. Participants also complacd bclicf tcnn cxprcssion 
tasks, in which they had to control the puppet and give clues to an experimenter in order 
that they could find the smartie, again using the sanic belief tcrms. The autistic group's 
performance on the false belief, belief tcnn comprehension and bclicf tcnn expression 
tasks were significantly poorcr than that of the Asperger, language impaired and nonnal 
groups. Moreover, across the groups an association was found bctwccn false belief task 
performance and belief term performance. The results, therefore, suggest a link between 
the dcvelopmcnt of ToNl and communicativc compctcncc in childrcn %%ith autism. 
Oswald and Ollendick (1989) investigated deception in autism using a Penny Iliding 
Game. In this game one person either guesses or hides. Both try to %%in. Ile hider hides 
the penny in one hand and then invites a guess. This technique is useful in that it is 
virtually frce of linguistic dcmands. Osu-ald ct al. (1989) found not only that thosc with 
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autism had a significant inability to dcccivc on this task, but also that this corrclatcd with 
faisc bclicf pcrfonnancc. This study suggcsts a lack in understanding of the "'seeing. 
lcads-to-knowing" principle. What is more. Os%%-ald ct al. (1989) railed to find evidence 
of autism-spcciric ddicits on false belief tasks, finding that the control group with 
intcllcctual difficultics also had probicnis %%ith the falsc belicf task. I lo%vcvcr, givcn the 
prcviously idcntiricd rclationship bct%vccn VNIA and ToNl, this study can be criticiscd for 
failing to provide vital information on the relationship bct%%-ccn performance on the 
deccption task and VNIA. 
Baron-Cohen (1992) attempted to extend Os%Nuld ct al. 's (1989) expcrinicnt. lie 
proposed that the game could be analysed in terms of what tile hidcr attempts to occlude. 
Ile hider must ensure the guesser does not see the pcnny (objcct occlusion) and prcvcnt 
any clues or access to information about where the penny might be (information 
occlusion- keeping the object's true location out of mind). Fiilccn children with autism 
were compared with 15 children with intellectual difficulties (no information providcd on 
aetiology) and 15 normally developing children matched for VNIA (BPVS). Results 
indicated that 85% of the children with autism compared to 34% of those will, intellectual 
difficulties and 16% of normally developing children %%-crc treating the game as if it %vcrc 
purely about object occlusion: keeping things out of sight but not out of mind. A 
rclationship mms found %%ith VNIA. Thosc childrcn failing to show infomiation occlusion 
in the control groups all had VNIAs less than thrcc-ycars four-months, significantly lowcr 
than those that succeeded. No such relationship %%ms found in the autism group. With 
regards to false belief performance, 74% of those with autism failed, compared to only 
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33% with intellectual difficultics and 27% ornormally dcvcloping children. Iliose 
passing were not signiricantly older in tcrnis of VNIA or CA. 17hcsc findings arc 
explained with reference to ToNI ability and supportcd by the comparison between 
deception capacity and tests of false belief. 17his again supports the notion that a 
proportion of those with autism understand seeing (object occlusion), but not that sccing- 
lcads-to-kno%%ing (infonnation occlusion). 
Lcslic ct al. (1988) cxamincd autistic childrcn's ability to undcrstand sccing, knowing and 
bclicving. They examincd 18 childrcn %Nith autism and 12 childrcn with spccific 
language impainncnt (however, further diagnostic infonnation on the spccific language 
impairment group was not given). All participants had both CA and VNfA (BPVS) above 
four-years. However, it should be noted they were not closely matched for cithcr. A 
limited knowledge task N,. Ms conducted to test the children's understanding of seeing and 
not seeing. The participant hides a counter in a container whilst another person is out of 
the room. They are then asked if the other experimenter knows that there is a counter 
under the container and where they %%ill look when they come back in the room. I`hcn a 
false belief task was used. Results suggested that only 35 % of the childrcn %kith autism 
that they tested could understand the role of visual access in knowledge formation. 
Moreover, proper comprehension of the lexical terms 'know' and 'think' Icndcd to go 
together with correct prediction of behaviour. The results suggest that, despite equal 
levels of verbal impainnent, children %vith spcciric language impaimicnt arc 
demonstrating language development difficulties that arc qualitatively distinct form the 
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languagc difficultics cxpcricnccd by childrcn with autism, providing furtlicr cvidcncc for 
the spcciric naturc of the communication impaimicnt of ciiildrcn with autisin. 
Pcmcr ct al. (1989) compared 26 childrcn, %vitlj autism loosely matched for VNIA (111, VS; 
thrcc-ycars onc-month to twclvc-), cars cight-months) and 12 childrcn with spcciric 
language impainncnt (VNIA; six-years clcvcn-montlis to ninc-ycars c1cm-months). 
Initially, mistaken bclicf was cxamincd. Childrcn %vcrc shown a typical box of s%%-ccts. 
All participants found that the box containcd somcthing c1sc, yct only four out of the 26 
autistic children were able to anticipate that anothcr child would make the same mistake 
in the sarne situation. Eleven of the 12 children %%ith spcciric language impaimicnt were 
able to successfully complctc this task. The childrcn %%ith autism %vcre also tcstcd for 
their ability to infcr knowledge about the content of a container, from having, or not 
having lookcd insidc. All four childrcnwho, had passcd the bclicf task and an additional 
four perfonncd perfcctly, but most failcd. The third task asscsscd childrcn's pragmatic 
ability to adjust their answers to provide nc%v, rather than repeat old infomiation. I lcrc 
too, most childrcn,. %ith autism scemed unabic to rcliably mak-c the corrcct adjustmcnt. 
This providcs somc evidcncc that undcrstanding 'kno%%ing' in this mmy is a componcnt of 
understanding false belief, since all four childrcn, %vho could understand false belief also 
understood the knowledgc-ignorancc distinction. However, thcrc werc another four 
children who demonstrated understanding of the kno%Ninglnot-kno%%ing distinction 
without understanding false belief. Which in turn could suggest, that children %%ith 
autism find this distinction slightly easier to understand. Baron-Cohcn and Goodhart 
(1994) extended the research of Lcsliect al. (1988) and Pemcrct al. (1989) by including a 
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group with intclicctual difficultics (rathcr than speciric languagc impairinctit). Iliercrorc, 
it was argucd that thcy could cvaluatc if this was an autism spccific dcricit. or simply a 
rcsult of the accompanying intclicctual dcricit found in the majority of childrcn with 
autism. Baron-Cohcn ct al. (1994) adaptcd the Pratt ct al. (1990) tccliniquc, using dolls to 
examine the role of visual access in kno%vlcdgc forniation. T%%-cl%-c childrcn with autism 
wcrc comparcd to thosc %%ith a "mcntal handicap but not autism", all with languagc 
comprchcnsion above threc-ycars six-montlis (Rc)mclI Developmental Language Scale; 
Rcyncll, 1991; orTROG). It is unclear, ho%%-cvcr, as to which test %%-as used for which 
participants. A prc-tcst task familiariscd participants with the gcncral proccdurc of 
choosing one of the dolls and eliminatcd, those %vho could not follow the proccdurc. For 
the experimental tasks a counter was placcd in a closcd box. Participants thcn %vatclicd as 
one of the dolls either looked inside or picked up the box. Each action was accompanicd 
by a statemcnt dcscribing what was happcning. The participants %N-crc thcn requircd to 
answer which doll knew what %%ms in the box. Results indicated that about a third of 
participantswith autism passed the test (criterion five out of fivc trials correct) in 
comparison to three quarters of the group %%ith intellectual difficultics. Ilicsc results arc 
consistcnt with findings of Leslic et al. (1988) and Pcmcrct al. (1989) as wcll as 
performance by children on the Penny Hiding Game (Baron-Cohcn, 1992; Oswald ct a]. 
1989). Moreover, the research suggests that Participants were not responding to the 
salience of the object (Russell ct al., 1991) as the children %vcrc not permitted to scc 
inside the box. Baron-Cohcn et a]. (1994) stated that rcsults reveal a fundamental 
inability to understand that to know something one has to have informational access to it. 
NVhat is more, they stated that the results indicate an autism-specific deficit. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ile litcraturc rcvic%N-cd indicatcs that inipaimicnts in ToNt arc not uniquc to autism. 
What may, however, be unique to autism is the scvcrity orti, c impairmcnt rallicr than the 
impairmcnt itsclf. Furthcr, many studics havc dcnionstmtcd variability in numbas 
passing tasks as well as clear cffccts of agc and mental age on task competence, with 
older and more able participants uith autism being more likely to pass (I lappe, 1995). It 
is important to rcmcmber that passing ToNt tasks docs not neccssarily imply an intact 
mcntalisitic or social competcncc. As Happe argucd, task perforniancc should only bc 
vic%vcd as a distant mcasure of undcrlying conipctcncc. 
Lcss information is kno%%m rcgarding the undcrstanding of informational acccss and 
knowledge in autism, as the majority of the studies have been with normally developing 
children. The studies that have been conducted indicate that understanding infonnational 
acccss constitutcs a fundamcntal aspcct of ToNI. Existing studics %%ith autistic cllildrcn 
have proposed an impainnent in understanding the sccing-icads-to-knowing principle. 
Whether individuals Nvith autism also fail to understand other implications of this 
principle, such as hearing-icads-to-kno%%ing or touching-Icads-to-knming, remains to be 
established. In this respect, it would be of interest to test children %%ith autism using 
O'Neill ct al. 's (1991) methodology. Given the variability in the age of understanding 
informational acccss (Pratt ct al., 1990, Wimmcr, ct al., 1988), the inclusion of 
participants %Nith VNIAs of thrcc-years and four-months in Baron-Cohcn ct al. 's (1994) 
study is problematic. This isconsolidatcd by O'Neill ctal. (1991) who indicated that 
multi-modal tasks involve a more complex rclationship between experiences and belief, 
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and rcquircahighcrCA to succcssfullycompictc. hiorco%, cr. ilouclicr(1989)idclitirlcd 
the problematic nature of using the BPVS as a mcasurc orVNIA. Nianyoftlicstudics 
have also been criticiscd ror having lo%v numbers of participants (I lobson, 199 1) and tile 
inclusion of individuals %vith Do%%m"s s)mdrorne (13ccghly ct al., 1990, Kasari ct al., 1990). 
To concludc, the ToM account of autism has bccn uscful in undcrstanding the 
communicativc and social difficultics in childrcn and adults with autism. 111c account 
has had less success, however, in explaining the non-social aspects orthc disorder, which 
include repetitive behaviour, restricted interests and activities, and uneven cognitivc 
profiles with isicts of ability (Frith and I lappc, 1994). Ilic findings of this rcvicw 
challcnge researchers to broaden the current vim-point rcgarding ToNf. It is suggcstcd 
that impairmcnts in ToM in autism and in othcr groups should not bc conccptualiscd as 
an -all or nothing" phcnomena. Rcscarch indicatcs that autistic individuals havc 
difficulty understanding the sccing-Icads-to-knowing principle. Tbc paucity of research 
into othcr modalitics suggcsts furthcr rcscarch in this arca. Furtlicnnorc, the nccd for 
work- in this area is strengthened by evidence that ToNt abilities in autistic children have 
been related to developmental factors, especially facility %%ith language. Future studies 
could assist in clarifying which groups of individuals, at what CAs, and of which 
abilities, pass different tasks assessing %urious aspects orToNI. 
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ABSTRAC71% 
spccific dcricit in Tlicary or Mind (rohl) abilitics has bccn proposcd to cxplain thc 
distinct pattcm of sociallcognitivc deficits in individuals with autism (Frith. 1989). Uslic 
and Frith 0 988), Pcmcr. Frith, tcslic and Lcckham 0 989) and Ilaron-Colim and 
Goodhart (1994) havc also indicatcd that childrcn with outism have a spccific difficulty in 
undcrstandingthcprincipictimt-sccingicadstokno%vitig7. However. other studies 
dcsigncd to mcasurc ToNI abilitics havc reportcd wcak mcntalising skills in individuals 
%%ith developmental language disorders (Shields, Vaticy, Broks and Simpson. 1996), clear 
pcopic (Pctcrson and Sicgal, 1995) and individuals %vith intclicctual difficultics (Shulman 
and Pilowsky, 1996). I-Iiis study was designed to examine the developmental and 
cognitivc corrclatcs of onc aspcct of ToNI. A nicthod dcrivcd from ONcill and Gopnik 
(1991) was adapted and children uith autism (n - 17), children mith intellectual 
difficultics of undiffcrcntiatcd actiology (n - 19). and nomially dcvcloping childrcn (n - 
21), wcrc comparcd on thcir ability to undcrstand dic principlc that -SEEING, FEELING 
and TELLING" lead to kno%ving. As prcdictcd. individuals %vith autism (88%) and 
children %%ith intellectual difficulties (63%) had difficulty identifying the role of 
infonnational acccss in knowledge, whercas the normally dcvcloping group did not 
(14%). Logistic rcgrcssion analyscs; rc%-calcd that group mcmbcrship and vcrbal mcntal 
agc. whcn mcasurcd by the Test for Rcccption of Grammar (TROG-. Bishop, 1983). %%Vrc 
the bcst prcdictors of task pcrformance. Discussion focuscs on the implications of the 
findings and cmphasiscs the nccd to carcfully considcr %%hat tasks actually mcasurc. as 
%vcll as the spccific actiology of comparison groups, %%Iicn studying abilitics and 
impairmcnts, of individuals %%ith autism and intclicctual difficultics. 
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INTRODUMON 
An extensive body of research investigating the psychological processes underlying 
autism has accumulated since Kanncr(1943) first described the spidrome ornutism. 'llic 
theory of mind (ToNI) hypotlicsis (11rcmack and Woodruff, 1978), a currctit und Icading 
h)Tootlicsis in the ficId. posits that the social and communicativc impairnicnis in autism 
rcsult from an impaircd ability to undcrstand mcntal staics. ToNt rcrers to the ability to 
infcr what othcrs arc thinking, bclicving and desiring in order to explain and predict their 
bchaviour (Baron-Cohcn, Lcslic and Frith, 1985). Childrcn %%ith nutism. likc nonnally 
developing thrcc-ycar olds, havc been shown to rail on a mngc or tasks designed to assess 
the understanding of mcntal states, including picture scqucncing, raise belicrand 
appcamncc rcality (Baron-Cohcn ct al., 1985. Baron-Colicn. 1989). Onc or the most 
influcntial dcvclopmcnts in this arca. has bccn the finding that childrcn with autism are 
significantly impaircd in thcir ToM abilitY. comparcd to the pcrfomiancc orchildrcn with 
Do%%m's syndromc, intcliectual difficultics. motional disturbancc and specific languagc 
impairmcnt (Baron-Cohcn ct al., 1985. Baron-Colicn, 1989; Rced and Pctcrson, 1990, 
Frith, flappc and Siddons, 1994; Lcslic and Frith, 1988; Pcmcr. Fdth. Leslic and 
Lcckham, 1989). 
Baron-Cohcn and Goodhart (1994) dcscribed a child's undastanding of the link bL-t%%-ccn 
informational acccss and knowlcdgc as a "comcrstonc principic of a ToM". As O'Ncill 
and Gopnik(1991) proposed, part orhaving a ToM is not only knowingthat wc know 
something, but also knowing how we know something. Kno%%ing about the source of a 
belief plays a vital role in evaluating the belief. deciding how trustworthy or justified it is 
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and howcasily itshould bcdiscardcd. lliengcnt%%Iticlitionliallydcvclopitigcliildrcii 
undustand this conccpt is bclicvcd to bc bct%%-ccn the ngcs or thrcc nnd four ycars, 
although thcrc is sonic discrcpancy in the litcmiurc as to the cxact agc (scc Winuncr, 
I logrcfc and Pcmcr. 1988 and Pratt and l1r)-ant. 1990). 
Baron-Cohen (1992) curnined deaption in autism. finding that 83% of childrcn willi 
autism comparcd to 34% of thosc, %%ith intcllcctual difficultics. and 16% of nonnally 
dcvcloping childrcn, wcrc trcating a pcnny hiding Samc as if it %%vrc purcly about objcct 
occlusion: kccping things out orsight but not out ormind. 'Mus, thc majority or 
individuals %%ith autism undcrstand sccing (objcct occlusion) but not that sccing-Icads-to- 
kno%%ing (information occlusion). Lcslic ct a]. (1988) cxarnincd autistic childrm's ability 
to understand seeing, kno%%ing and bclicving, compared to children %%ith spccific language 
impainncnt on a limitcd knowlcdgc tasL Rcsults dcnionstratcd that only 35% of childrcn 
%vith autism could understand the role of visual access in knowledge formation. In a 
similar study Pemcr ct al. (1989) found that only 4414 of a group %%itll autism undcrstood 
the roic of visual acccss in know] edgc. Baron-Cohcnctal. (1994)cxtcndcdtficrcscarch 
of Lcslic ct al. (1988) and Pcmcrct al. (1989), by including a group %kith intclicctual 
difficulties (mthcr than specific language inipainncnt). Using a technique adapted fmm 
Pratt and Bryant (1990), they used dolls to c\anlinc the role of visual access in kno%vlcdgc 
formation. Participants obscrvcd, as onc of two dolls cithcr lookcd insidc, or pickcd up a 
closed box in which a counter had been placed. Results indicated that a third of 
participants %%ith autism passcd the tcst in comparison to thrcc-quartcrs of dic group with 
intclicctualdifficultics. Participants did not appear to be mpondingto thc salicncc ortlic 
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objcct (contmry to thc prcdictions madc by Ilusscil, hiautlincr. Sharpe and I*ids%%, cll 
(1991) as the ciiildrcn were not pcmilled to see inside the box. Ilic assalions rmill this 
papcr wcrc congrucnt mith the prcdiction that childrcn uith oulism expaicnce significant 
difficulty in understanding that to know sonicthing one has to have inronnational access 
to it. Othcr studics (c. g. O'Ncill ct al., 1991) havc cumincd difilcmit modalitics in 
undcrstandinginfomiational access. I lo%%-c%-cr. the stud ics have tcndcd to use nonnal ly 
dcvcloping children to dctcrTninc the dcvclopnicntal ap of ability. concluding that thrcc- 
year olds had difficulty identifying the source of their knowledge, %%hcrcas four and five. 
ycar olds did not. Unfonunatcly. as yct, no studics havc cxarnincd the cfrccts of differcnt 
modalitics on informational acccss, using participants %%ith autism. 
7heory of Alin& AnAutism Specific Deficit? 
Sigman (1994) argucd that for a dcricit in ToM to be considcrcd as primary or ccntral to 
autism, it has to bc manifestcd in all or almost all individuals %vith autism, and it has to bc 
uniquc, that is, not manifcstcd by most individuals %vith othcr clinical diagnoscs. 
llo%vcver, considembic %-ariation in the pcrfomiancc orci, ildrcn uith autism on ToNI 
tasks has been found. 11c proportion of children N%ith autism passing standard first ordcr 
ToNt tasks . -arics from IS% to 60116 (1 lappc. 1995). Lm infonnation is known about 
infonnational acccss tasks, although raics havc %-adcd from I SO, a to 44% (Baron-Colien ct 
al., 1994; Pemcr ct al., 1989). Poor ToNt skills havc also b-ecn rcporlcd in individuals 
%%ith schizophrcnia (Corcoran, Frith and hicrccr, 1995), profound prelingual dcafncss 
(Peterson and Sicgal, 1993) and intcliectual difficulties of non-specific actiology 
(Yirmiya, Solomonica-Lcvi, and Shulman and Pilowsky, 1996). What is more. l3ccghly, 
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Wciss-Perry, and Cicclictti (1990) and Kasari, Mundy, Yimiiya, and Signian, (1990) have 
proposcd that difTcrcnccs bct%%-ccn individuals with Do%%m's syndrome and outism may 
indicatc a spcciric strcngth of thosc with Down's syndromc, and not a dcricit in thosc 
withautism. I'licsc studics imply that what may bc uniquc to autism is the scvcrity oroic 
impainncnt mthcr than the impairmcnt itself. 
Developmental and Cognitive Correlates 
Variation in task pcrformancc could bc cxplained by the influcncc of dcvclopnicntal and 
cognitivc factors in addition to, or abovc. diagnostic group status. Both Baron-Cohcn 
(1992) and Lcslie ct al. (1988) rcportcd significant associations bct%vccn first-ordcrToNl 
task performancc and chronological agc (CA). Charnian and 13aron-Cohcn (1992) and 
Eisemnajer and Prior (199 1), indicatcd significant associations bet%%-ccn pcrfonnance on 
tasks and vcrbal mcntal agc (VNIA). Furthcr rescamh by Prior, Dahlstrom and Squircs 
(1990), reported significant correlations between task Performance, VNIA and CA. Itis 
imPOrtant to notc (sec Happc and Frith, 1995) that although agc and vcrbal ability may bc 
necessary they arc not sufficient to ensure success on ToNt task-s. Recent studies have 
further supported the important contribution of developmental and cognitive factors to 
successful performance on first-order ToNt tasks in children %%ith autism (Sparrcvolin and 
Hourie, 1995; Yinnip et al., 1996). Ilcrc is much Icss rcscarch on the influcncc of agc 
and mental age as predictors of success on tasks assessing understanding of informational 
access and knowledge. 
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Insights into autism provided by the ToNI account havc proved useful. It is, however, 
important to remember that task success does not necessarily imply intact mcntalising 
ability or social competence in autism. Ilappc (1994)dcnionstmtcd that intact false bclicr 
task performance did not rulc out severe Imndicaps in social understanding and social 
interaction in everyday life. Unrortunatcly, there is a tendency to equate test pcrfonliance 
%ith underlying cognitivc ability, and %%hilc researchers arc oilcn keen to show that thcrc 
arc many reasons for failing a test. they rarely consider that there may be quite as many 
ways of passing it. Clearly, tasks designed to tap the ability to represent mcntal states, 
also involve other psychological abilities such as language and memory, and impairmcnt 
in any one of these areas might lead to task failure. liappc(1993)tlicrcforcargucdtliat 
task performance should only be vic%%-cd as an indirect measure of underlying 
competence. 
Aims ofthe Present Study 
Previous studies examining informational access and knowledge in autism lla%-c 
concentrated on the visual modality. The prcscnt study sets out to replicate and extend 
previous findings by examining whether impaired performance on tasks aimed at 
assessing understanding of informational access and knowledge, arc cross modal in 
individuals with autism. Do children with autism understand that Seeing, Feeling and 
Telling lead to kno%ving? Morcovcr, the study investigates %%-hcthcr any dcFicits in 
understanding arc unique to autism. It %%-as Nt that the most appropriate control groups 
would be individuals %%ith intellectual difficultics of non-specific actiology and 
individuals with normal development. As it has been difficult to disentangle specific 
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ToNI dericits from ollicr variabics, this study intcnds to cxplorc the conditions undcr 
which pcrformancc on inforniational tasks may vary. Nur potcntial modcmtor variabics 
NNill tlicrcforc be cxamincd, CA. VNIA, degrcc oroutism and gcndcr. Bascd on prcvious 
rcscarch, it is prcdictcd that a significant numba of childrcn with nutism and childrcn 
uith intcllcctual difficultics will fail the tasks, whcrcas ti, c majority ornonnally 
dcvcloping childrcn will pass the tasks. llcrromiancc will thcrcrorc bc in the rollowing 
ordcr: autism < intcllcctual difficultics < normally dcvcloping childrcn. 
3-9 
METHOD 
Design 
A quasi -cx pcri mcntal, bct%%-ccn-partici pants dcsign %%-as crnploycd, comprising of dirce 
groups, childrcn %sith autism, cliildrcn with intclicctual difficultics and normally 
dcvcloping childrcn. 
Participants 
Includcd. in the study %Nvre 17 childrcn %Nith autism (AUT-. 15 bo)s, 2 girls), 19 cliildrcn 
Nvith intcllcctual difficultics of unknown actiology and %ithout autism (it).. 13 boys, 6 
girls), and 21 nonnally dc%-cloping childrcn (ND, II boys, 10 girls). Dctails of participant 
characteristics arc presented in Table 1. All the children with autism attended special 
schools and had been diagnoscd (indcpcndcntly of flic prcscnt study) by cither an 
Educational Psychologist or a Pacdiatfician according to DSNI. IV (Anicrican Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) or ICD-10 (World licalth Organisation, 1992) critcria. All thc 
childrcn %%idi intcliectual difficultics attcndcd onc school for children %%ith modcmtc 
learning difficultics. Thc normally dcvcloping childrcn %%-crc scicctcd from two, Local 
Authority primary schools and %%-crc selected on the basis of achieving at least a%-cragc 
levels for their age in school, and having no idcntificd disordcrs or impainunts. All 
participants had English as thcir first languagc. 
One-way analysis of variance conrimicd thcrc was a significant diffcrcncc bct%vccn the 
groups in tenns of chronological agc (F = 39.7. (2.54), p <. 001). Post hocTukcy's 11 
3-10 
tcsts conrimicd that the ND childrcn Wcrc significantly youngcr than the ollicr two 
groups. Additionally. Chi Squarc analysis rcycaled that although thcrc was a trcnd 
to%%urds diffcrcnces in gcndcr across the groups this %m not statistically significant Q2 
5.590, (2), p- . 061). 
Table 1. Participant Variables (NIcan. SD and Range) 
VARIABLES 
AUT 
(N-17) 
11) 
(N-19) 
ND 
(N-21) 
Age (yesirs) 9.7.2.6 9.3.1.0 5.7,0.3 
(5.0-14.0) (7.4-11.0) (3.0-6.3) 
TROG 5.8,1.6 51: 0.9 6.0,. 1.0 
(4.0-10.0) (4.0-7.0) 4.3-8.0 
BPVS 6.1,1.3 5.7.1.0 6.2: 1.1 
(4.3-8.8) (4.3-8.0) (3.8-7.8) 
CARS 29.9.6.0 16.6,11 15.0; 0 
(19.5 -43.0) (16.0-20.3) (13.0 - 15.0) 
Nisics: Fcmales 13: 2 13: 6 11: 10 
Measures 
Verbal Mental Age 
Bouchcr (1989) suggcstcd that using the British Picturc Vocabulary Scalc (BPVS. Dunn, 
Dunn, NVhctton and Pintilic, 1982) to asscss; VNIA is problcmatic in childrcn %kith autism, 
as it only tests recognition of single words. U%ilc most individuals with autism have 
serious verbal communication difficulties, they do dcvclop vcrbal kno%%-Icdgc of single 
words. It is plausible, therefore, that single %%Drd recognition is correlated differently with 
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othcr aspccts of vcrbal and gcncral ability ror various clinical groups. 11crcrorc. VNIA 
was asscsscd using both the BPVS and the Tcst ror Rcaption of Gmmrnar (TROG-. 
Bishop, 1983). To cnablc languagc agc matching. inclusion critcria %N-crc sct at tvtwccn 
four and cight ycars on at Icast onc tcst of VNIA. 
Onc-%%my ANOVAs %vcre uscd to cxaminc if thcrc %%-crc difTcrcnccs bct"-ccn the groups in 
tcnns of VNIA. Analysis rcvcalcd no significant diffcrenccs bct%%-cen the groups on cithcr 
thcBPVS(F=1.316, (2,54). p-. 277orthcTROG(F-2.377, (2.54), p-. 103). To 
dctcrminc if thcrc, %%vrc any diffcrcnccs within groups, BINS and TROG scorcs wcrc 
compared using related samples t-tcsts. 11csc revealed no significant differences with 
the AUT(t= 1.29, (16), p=. 217); ID(t= 1.52, (18), p-. 146); or ND groups (t-. 71, 
(20), p =. 485). 
Childhood Autism Rating Scale 
All children werc charactcriscd by their scores on the Childhood Autism Rating Scale 
(CARS; Schoplcr, Rcichlcr, Devcllis, and Daly, 1980). CARS rating cnabled 
examination of degree of autism as well as ruling out autism in the other two groups. 
Thcrc was a significant diffcrcncc in CARS scorcs bct%%-ccn the groups (Kruskal Wallis - 
52.786, (2) p <. 001, as CARS data not normally distributcd). Furthcr analysis or CARS 
scorcs rcvcalcd that thcrc %%-crc significant difrcrcnccs bct%%-ccn AUT and ID groups 
(Mann NVIlitricy U=1. n= 36, p<. 001) and bctwccn AUT and ND groups (U - 0, n- 38. 
p <. 001), mith the AUT group scoring highcst. Additionally thcrc %%-asadiffcrcncc 
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bctwccn ID and ND groups (U - 0. n- 40, p <. 001), %vill, the ID group scoring highcr. 
Examination of mcan scorcs rcvcalcd that thc diffcrcnccs betwccii ID and ND groups 
%%-crc small in comparison to diffcrcnccs bct%%-ccn othcr two pairs. 
Materials 
A "'Toy tunncl" approximatcly 3 10 x 320 x 160 min mus construclcd and co%-crcd with 
fabric. Both opcnings %vcrc also covcrcd mith flaps of fabric. T%%v dolls %%-crc uscd, cach 
approximatcly 39 cm tall, onc malc (John) mith short black hair. and thc officr fcmale 
(Sally) %%ith long blondc hair, rathcr than two rcrnalc charactcrs (usually Sally and Annc) 
cmploycd in somc prcvious rcsc=h (c. g. Baron-Cohcn ct aL, 1985). It %%-as hopcd that 
this made it casicr for the childrcn to discriminate the charactcrs and rcduccd the 
possibility of misunclustanding. Thrcc objccts N%, crc uscd: a kcy-, a ball; and a toy car. 
The objects were kept in a covcrcd box, and %vhcn an object was transfcrrcd to the tunncl 
it %%-as covered %vith an opaque scarf. Participants' responses were rccordcd manually on a 
score sheet (see Appendix 1). 
Procedure 
Written consent was received from all parcnts/guardians prior to childrcn participating in 
the study. All participants were screened by the investigator individually in a room 
%%ithout distractions at the schools conccmcd. I'lic CARS %%-as givcn to the rclcvant 
tcacher to complctc follo%%ing cxplanation. Tbc BPVS and TROG u-cre thcn 
administcrcd, followcd by Tasks 1.2 and 3. For both asscssnicnt and cxFvrimcntal tasks 
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the participant and investigator sat next to cach othcr at a table. No commcnts %N-crc made 
rcgarding the corrcctncss or otlicr%visc of rcsponscs. 
Tasks 
Task]: Pre-testcontrolconditiom Ilis task ramiliariscd participants with thc gcncral 
proccdurc of choosing onc of the dolls and climinatcd participants who ivcrc unabic to 
follow the simpic proccdurc. First, the invcstigator took out two dolls and said to cach 
participant: "This is John and this is Sally". I'lic participant was thcn askcd the naming 
qucstion: "Which is John? Which is Sally? " Ncxt participants \\-crc shown the thrcc 
objects and asked to name them. All participants passcd tlicsc questions. I-lic 
investigator then said: -Let"s give John the car and Sally a ball. " I laving watchcd the 
investigator give each doll an object, the participants %\-crc asked: -\ý`ho has the ball, John 
or Sally? " This last qucstion constitutcd a control condition to the main cxperimcnt, 
reported below, in comprising a story but entailing no knowledge formation. Six trials 
werc givcn to cach participant, in which the objcct and ordcr in which the dolls %%-crc 
mcntioncd were randomised across participants. Rcsponses u-cre rccordcd as Pass or 
Fail. Again, all participants answered corrcctly on all six trials and werc thcrcforc 
permitted to participate in the second experimental task. 
Task 2: split into two parts (Xaming Question and Source Question), to determine 
another's knowledge and identi)5, the source ofthat biosvIcdge. Ilic invcstigator 
introduced the experimental task to the participant by placing the tunnel on the table and 
saying: "Look! This is my tunnel, you can lift up the material and look inside. But %%hen 
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the matcrial is down you cannot scc what is insidc. Now %%-c arc going to play a gamc. I 
am going to place things inside the tunnel and thcn I am going to ask you %% hich or the 
dolls, Sally or John, knows what is insidc the tunncl. and how thcy know mhat is insidc? " 
The participants thcn rcccivcd 12 cxpcrimcntal trials, four for cach of the thrcc typcs or 
sourcc infonnation (Sccing, Fccling and Tclling). 
In the Seeing trial, one of the objects was placed into the tunncl using the scarf to prcvcnt 
the participant from seeing what %%us inside the tunnel. 1-hc investigator then made one 
doll lift up the material and "look" inside, and the other doll walk around the tunncl 
looking at the outsidc. Each action was accompanicd %%ith a stalcmcnt such as, -John lifts 
up the flap and has a look inside. Sally touches the tunncl and looks at the tunncl". Ilic 
participant was thcn asked "Who knows what is inside the tunnel, John or Sally? " I'lic 
child's response ums again markcd on the response shccL If the participant responded 
correctly to the identity of the doll they %%vrc then asked the source question. This %%-as 
initially done in the fonn of an open-ended question: "I low do they know %% hat is inside"? 
if the participant responded immediatcly, thcy %%-crc scorcd as cithcr corrcct or incorrcct. 
if the participant did not respond immediately, the sourcc question was rcpcatcd and the 
participant prcscntcd %Nifli d= forccd-choicc aitcmativcs that spccificd the diffcrent 
possible sources of infonnation (-Because thcy fclt inside, bccausc they saw what %vas 
inside or because they %N-cre told what was inside? "). The three aitcmati%-cs %%-crc 
presented separately and the participants rcquircd to rcspond "yes" or "no" to cach. The 
answers were counted as correct if responded to in the appropriate order. 
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Thc Fccling trial was much the same, except the investigator made one ortlic dolls put a 
hand under the matcrial and "'reel" inside the tunnel. and the other doll touches the tunnel 
and put it down again. Again cach action was rollowcd with a statcnicnt such as: "Sally 
puts her hand inside the tunnel and takes it out again. John touches the tunnel'*. 
Ilic Telling procedure %k-as the same, except the investigator %%liisrwrcd the idcntity of the 
object to one of tlic dolls. %%Iicrcas the othcr doll was %%Iiispcrcd the time. Again cach 
action was follo%%-cd with a statenicnt: -1 arn going to tc1l John %vhat time it is. 
(Whispering) John it is ........ I arn going to tell Sally uhat is inside the tunnel. 
(Whispering) Sally flicrc is a ......... 
in the tunncl". 
On cach of the trials the order of the doll that looks, fccls or is told, versus the other 
actions of touching the tunnel etc. were randorniscd. Additionally, the ordcr in %%hich the 
two dolls were mcntioncd in the clucstion %%-crc randorniscd and the forccd choice 
alternatives %%-crc countcrbalanced. Ilis nicant that the participant rcmained ignorant or 
the contents of the tunnel, and therefore had to ans%%-cr the questions purely on the basis of 
, what can be ascribed to another character. Participants rccci%-cd three individual scorcs for 
tile Naming tasks (Seeing, Feeling and Telling) and three individual scores for the Source 
tasks (regardless of either open-ended or forced choice forniat). 
Task 3: Identifying and differentialing the various conilmnent activities of. Seeing, Feeling 
and Telling. The materials for this task %%-crc identical to those described earlier. After 
completing tile previous task the participants werc asked if they would help John to play a 
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game, by helping him to rind out what was inside the tunnel. Ilic investigator then placed 
one of the covered objects into the tunnel and the participant %%-as told: -John wants to 
know what is insidc the tunncl". llis %%us follo%%vd by onc ortiacc qucstions: -cun you 
help John to see what is inside the tunnel? " -Can you help John to feel %%hat is inside the 
tunncl? " or "Can you tc1l John what is insidc the lunncl? " Ilic proccdurc %%w rcpcatcd in 
ordcr that cach qucstion %%ms askcd micc, thcrc bcing six trials in total. Inic ordcr of the 
qucstions %vcrc countcrbalanccd. Individuals %%-crc scorcd as coffcct ir. - 
(a) in the "scc trial, " they lifIcd up the tunnel or let John look under the fabric flaps, (b) in 
the -fccl trial, " thcy put John"s hand insidc the tunncl. (c) in the -tcll trial, " thcy told John 
the identity of the object in the tunnel. 
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RESULTS 
Naming and Source Task 
Tablc 2 summariscs pcrformancc on the Naming and Sourcc tasks. It is clcar that 
pcrfonnancc of thosc participants with autism %vas %vorsc in comparison to thosc with 
intcllcctual difficultics and normally dcvcloping individuals on both Naming and Sourcc 
qucstions, rcgardicss of modality. 
Table 2. 
Performance (Number. hican and SD of participants passing trials) on the Naming and Source Task 
AUT 
N-17 
SEEING 
ID 
N-19 
ND 
N-21 
LIT 
N-17 
FELLING 
ID 
Nm19 
ND 
N-21 
AUT 
N-17 
TIELLING 
11) 
N*19 
ND 
N-21 
NAMING 
Trials passed 
0 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 2 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 
2 4 0 0 3 2 1 7 0 0 
3 6 3 0 3 2 0 1 4 0 
4 5 14 20 3 13 20 8 14 20 
Alean 2.8 3.3 3.9 21 3.3 3.9 2.9 3.6 3.9 
S. D. 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.2 0.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 
SOURCE 
Trials passed 
0 8 3 1 12 4 1 10 3 1 
1 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 
2 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 
3 2 3 0 0 3 1 0 3 1 
4 4 13 1() 3 9 Is 3 12 19 
Mean 1.5 31 3.9 11 2.6 3.7 1.3 3.1 Is 
S. D. 1.7 1.3 0.9 1.9 1.6 1.0 1.8 1.3 0.9 
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As with prcvious rcscarch (e. g. Baron Colicn ct A, 1985), and as indicated by the 
distribution of scorcs (scc Appcndix 11), the childrcn %%-crc rcquircd to ans%%vr the Naming 
qucstion correctly on all trials, to be considercd to havc passed that particular modality. 
The probability of achicving this combincd succcss cfitcfion by gucssing is. 06. Ilic 
samc critcrion was used for passing the Sourcc qucstion. Using this critcrion, 
pcrformancc of thosc with autism %%-as %vorsc in comparison to thosc with iniclicctual 
difficultics and nonnally dcvcloping individuals, on both Naming and Source questions 
regardicss of modality, as illustmtcd in Tabic 3. 
Table 3. Total (Number, Percent3ge and Statistics) of Participants Passing, Each Task. 
AUT ID ND 
(N-17) (N-19) (N-21) Ikl%"n Group Anal)sis 
NAMING: 
Seeing 5 (29.4! i) 14 (73.71, i) 20 (95-110) 106(2), p<. 001 XI -M 
Feeling 5 (29.4%) 13(68.416) 20 (95. r. &) X' - 18.3 58 (2). p< . 00 1 
Telling 8 (47.1 "1; ) 14 (73.7%) 20 (951%) XI - 11146 (2). p -. 01 
Composite score 3 (17.6*, '*) 10 (32.61 &) 20 (93.2%) xI - 23.526, (2). p <. 001 
SOURCE: 
Seeing 4(23.54, o) 13 (68.40.6) 20 (95.2%) XI - 21.3 64 (2). p< . 00 1 
Feeling 5 (29.4%) 9 (47.4%) Is (83.7%) X2 - 12.9 83 (2), p- . 005 
Telling 5 (29A i) 12 (63.20, i) 19 (90.5%) XI - 15.053 (2). p- . 002 
Composite score 2(11.81, e) 7 (36.8"0; ) 18 (85.7%) XI - 21.874. (2). p< . 00 1 
DIFFERENTIATION: 15 (88.2%) 19 (1 W, 1) 21 (1 W,,; ) 
#Cnicrion for passing- corica on all tnals. 
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Differentiation Task 
Childrcn %N-crc rcquircd to answcr the DifTcrcntiation clucstion corrcctly on all six trials to 
bc considcrcd to havc passcd the task. I'lic probability of achicving this combincd 
succcss critcrion by gucssing is. 0014. As Tabic 3 illustratcs, pcrromiancc was almost at 
ceiling for all groups, with two people failing in the autism group (being correct on rive 
out of the six trials). The results of the control task suggest that children had little trouble 
idcntifying the corrcct modality and diffcrcntiating bctwccn thcm. 
Naming Question Analysis 
Analysis within cach group using Cochran's Q rcvealcd no significant cffcct of modality: 
AUT (Q =3 (2), p =. 223); ID (Q =. 286 (2), p =. 867) and ND (Q =. 000(2), p= 1). A 
composite score %Nms calculated (this was the number of individuals passing all Seeing, 
Feeling and Telling questions). Chi square analysis (see Table 3) revealed significant 
betwcen-group differences on all individual modalities and on the composite score. Mean 
scores revealed the order of performance to be AUT < ID < ND. Comparing pairs of 
groups, Fisher's exact probability revealed that there Nverc significant differences in 
composite scores between AUT and ID(. 04 1), between AUT and ND (< . 00 1) and 
betNvccn ID and ND (. 003) groups. 
Source Question Analysis 
Analysis within each group using Cochran's Q revealed no significant, cffcct of modality: 
AUT (Q =. 5(2), Pý . 779); ID (Q = 3.250 (2). p=. 197) and ND (Q = 3.0(2), p =. 223). 
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Between groups chi square analysis (see Table 3) revealed signiricant difrcrcnecs between 
groups on all individual modalities and on the compositc score. Mean scores revealed the 
order of pcrfonnancc to be AUT < ID < ND. Comparing pairs of groups, Fisher's exact 
probability revealed that there were no significant differences in composite scores 
between AUT and ID groups (. 128), but that there were signi ficant di ffcrcnccs between 
AUT and ND (<. 001) and bct%vccn ID and ND (. 003) groups. 
The role of CA, Gender, CARS, TROG, BPVS 
Due to low numbers passing the tasks in the AUT group and so few people failing in the 
ID and ND groups, statistical comparisons of those who passed or failed tasks was 
limitcd. Logistic regrcssion %N-as thcrcforc uscd to investigatc the cffcct of potcntial 
moderator variables on composite Naming question performance. Table 4 shows that six 
variables, Age, Gender, CARS, TROG, BPVS and Group, %vcrc entered into the equation 
simultaneously. Group variable %N-as converted into two dummy variables (AUT-NOI) 
(ID-NOI) with the ND group as the reference variabic. Results indicate that 86.0% of 
cases were correctly classified using those variables. Group membership (both AUT and 
ID) and TROG scores were significantly associated %Nith performance on the Naming 
task. 
A logistic regression with composite Source question performance as the dependent 
variable, using the same set of independent variables (see Table 5) indicated that 78.9% 
of cases were correctly classified, and that Group membership (both AUT and ID) and 
TROG were again significantly associated %Nith performance. 
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DISCUSSION 
This study comparcd the pcrformancc of autistic childrcn and childrcn with intclicctual 
difficultics and nonnally dcvcioping childrcn on tasks aimcd at asscssing undcrstanding 
of informational acccss and knowlcdgc. nc rcsults support the hypotlicsis t1lat 
individuals with autism perform poorly comparcd to both normally devcloping and 
intcllcctually disablcd groups on such tasks. 'Mis rcscarch cxtcnds prcvious work in 
demonstrating that ToXI dcricits in undustanding informational acccss and kno%vlcdge 
appear to be cross modal. Ilus a significant number of participants with autism lack 
understanding of the Seeing, Feeling and Tclling-icads-to-knowing principle. Autistic 
children's perfonnance, on single modalities was consistent %ith previous studies (e. g. 
Baron-Cohen ct al., 1994; Leslie ct al., 1988, Pemer ct al., 1989) as only a third of 
participants managcd to pass thcsc tasks. Ovcrall pcrfonnancc, as demonstratcd by the 
composite score, vms worse, %%ith 12% of participants %Nith autism passing the whole task. 
A similar number of children with autism failed Baron-Cohcn"s (1992) Penny Iliding 
Game. The errors made, reveal a fundamental inability to understand the intent involved 
in hiding an object. 
This pattern of results also reflects the vanation in pcrfonnancc on other ToXI tasks 
identified by Happc (1995). O'Neill ct al. (1991) proposed that multi-modal tasks were 
more complex as a result of the nccd for differentiation bct%vccn modalities. What is 
more, they found that such tasks required a higher chronological age in normally 
developing children. However, adopting a more conservative age range of above four 
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ycars as indicatcd by O'Ncill ct al. (1991) did not rcsult in improvcd pcrronnance in the 
autism group. 
Some additional conclusions can be dm%%m. I'lic results arc unlikely to have bccn due to 
the participant simply rcsponding to the salience of the objcct. (as has bccn suggested by 
Russcll ct al., 1991), as participants did not scc insidc the tunncl or the idcntity of the 
object being placed in the tunnel. Additionally, deficits were unlikely to havc been due to 
motivation or distraction as all participants %%-crc rcquircd to pass the prc-tcst task. What 
is more, the Identirication/Diffcrcntiation task ensured that participants' results wcrc not 
due to an inability to differentiate between modalities. Examination of potential 
moderator variables indicated that Group status and TROG, score appcarcd to bc the best 
predictors of task performance. 'Mis is in lincuith research that has suggested a 
relationship between ToNI perfonnancc and verbal ability (Trillingsgaard, 1996; 1 lappe, 
1995; Sparrevohn and Ilovdc, 1995). 
These results replicate previous findings indicating that ToNt ability is seriously impaired 
in individuals with autism. However, such accounts have also assumed an autism 
specific deficit, a view challenged by this study. As predicted, a significant number of 
participants with intellectual disabilities also failed the tasks, whereas performance of the 
normally developing children was in line v6ith previous research, with almost all passing 
the tasks. The present findings support the notion that what may be unique to autism is 
the severity of the impairment rather than the impainnent itself (Yinniya ct al., 1998). 
Researchers interested in autism have typically included individuals %vith intellectual 
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difficulties as their comparison groups. Ilicsc findings suggest that comparison groups 
must be carcfully cvaluatcd and tak-cn into account %%-Iicn intcrprcting data and infcff ing 
conclusions. Morcovcr, flic common practisc of including individuals with Do%vn's 
syndrome as a comparison group, referred to as individuals with intellectual difficultics is t -'ý\ 
problematic. Additionally, including individuals with Do%%m's syndrome and individuals 
with intcllcctual difficultics rcsulting from othcr actiologics in onc comparison group, 
may also not bc the optimal approach. 
N, 
Another puzzle for the ToNI hypothesis arises from Peterson and Siegal's (1995) study of 
childrcn Nvith profound prelingual dcafncss. Thcy found that in this group of childrcn, all 
with normal intelligence, 65% failed a simple test of false belief. Aside from the 
communication impairmcnt associatcd, %Nith prelingual dcafncss, thcsc childrcn did not 
demonstmte autistic featurcs. The finding that individuals mith intclicctual difficultics 
and other disorders are also impaired in their abilities to pass tasks aimed at assessing 
ToM, does not exclude the possibility that distinct elements (empathic ability, various 
dimensions of cognitive ability, social relations, etc. ) of this ability arc differently 
impaired in various groups of individuals. For example, the studies of dcaf children point 
to the importance of social learning or of an acquircd element in ToNt abilities, %vhcrcas 
studies regarding individuals with intellectual difficulties point to the importance of 
cognitive faculties. Furthermore, similar or poor task pcrformancc bctwccn the groups 
does not necessarily indicate similarities in the processes underlying task performance. 
They could be tackling the task in a fundamentally difTercnt way, or may not correctly 
understand the task. There is some evidence for this v-ithin the present study when 
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analysing some of the autistic children's responses. For example, instead of identifying a 
modality, one person replied I think it is inside the tunnel"' or by guessing what was in 
the tunnel I think it is a key". There is an ongoing debate as to the appropriate method 
or methods of data collection regarding ToNI ability. Only by examining the competence 
of different clinical groups on tasks aimed at assessing ToNt abilities, will we 
cnhancc our understanding of its varying components and their origin. 
This study is somewhat limited due to its size. Moreover, the difficulty associatcd with 
rccruiting and studying rarc syndromcs such as autism has implications for flic 
interpretation of any findings. Larger numbers would, however, enable greater 
generalisation of results and allow for fullcr examination of potential moderator variables. 
It may be for example that the developmental trajectories of individuals with different 
actiologies and mental abilities differ. Future studies could directly address this issue, 
considering inter-group analyses, ideally %Nith large samples. 
To conclude, the results of this study have replicated findings of a reduced ability in 
autism to understand the role of informational access as a source of knowledge. 
Furthermore, performance of those individuals, %Nith intellectual difficulties indicates that 
deficits in ToM ability are not unique to autism. Finally, the variability in performance 
0\1 
on ToM tasks indicates that explanations may be more complex than suggested by 
existing theoretical models. Further work is necessary to delineate what these and other 
ToM tasks actually measure. 
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APPENDIX I 
Example of Scorc Shccl 
, NAI%IF. 
1 1)011: AUT( ) 11)( ) ND 
Task I l1rc test 
A. Ili I'm Gerrard and today I am going to ask you sonic questions. To help me I have 2 do lls; this IsJohn (lift on 
tablc) and this is Sally (lift on table) John (touch) and Sally (touch). Can you show me %% hich I sJohn.... and now 
-o hich is Sally? " -NN'cil doneU. " 
B. Place objects on table. "Now here arc a few things can you tell mcA hat they arc callctl? " Well done, ...... 
(alternativeltq : "Can you point to the-" . . C. I Now Ict's give the ball to Sally and the cartoJohn. Who has the car Sally orJohn? Sally John 
2 Now Ict's give the car to John and the ball to Sally. Who has the ball Sally or John? Sally John 
3 Now Ict's give the ball to Sally and the cartoJohn. Who has the car Sally orJohn? 
Sally John 
4 Now Ict's give the car to John and the bal I to Sally. Who has the car Sally or John? Sally John 
5 Now Ict's give the car to Sally and the ball to John. Who has the ball Sally or John? Sally John 
6 Now let's give the car to Sally and the ball to John. Who has thc car Sally or John? I Sally John 
Task 2. 
This 13 my toy tunnel, you can lift up the material and look Inside, but, % hen the material Is down you can't scc 
inside. Now we are going to play a game. I am going to put things Inside the tunnel and then I am going to ask 
f you which doll knows what's inside the tunnel? Place object into the tunnel using scarr. - , I. A. John Scein -Sally" 
Who knows what is inside the tunnel Sally or John? saliv John , B. Ilow do they know what is inside? Response , C. Do they know what is insidc because: Thcv saw %khat was inside? Yes No 
Thcv fclt inside? Yes No 
I told them %%hat was insidc? Ycs No 
2. A. John Seeinz "John" 
Who knows what is inside the tunnel Sally or John? Sally John , B. Ilow do they know what is inside? Response 
C. Do they know what is inside because: Thcy saw %%hat was inside? Yes No 
I told thcm %%hat was inside? Yes No 
Thcv felt inside? VC3 No 
3. A. Lohn Fecling "Sally" 
Who knows what is inside the tunnel Sally or John? " Sally John 
B. How do thcy know what is inside? Response 
C. Do they know what is inside becausc: Tlicv fclt insidc? Yes No 
I told thcm what %vas inside? Yes No 
Thcv saw %%hat was insidc? Ves, No 
4. A. Sally. 1c_Cr1n_9 "Sally" 
Who knows what is inside the tunnel. Sally rJohn? " S211V John 
B. 1low do they know what is inside? Response 
C. Do they know what is inside because: Thcv fclt inside?? Yes No 
111cy saw %%hat mas inside Yes No 
I told thcm what was inside? Yes No 
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Z. A. Sally'rold "John" 
_Who 
knows what is inside the tunnel Sally o John? Sally John 
_B. 
Ilow do they know what is inside? Response 
C. Do they know what Is Inside because: I told them %,., hat was inside? Yes No 
Tlicy fc1t inside? Yes No 
111cy saw %%hat was inside? Yrs No 
6. A. Sally SccineSally" 
_Who 
knOW3 what is inside the tunnel John o Sally? Sally John 
. 
B. Ilow do they know what is inside? Rqponse 
C. Do they know what is inside because: 
_I 
told them %Nhat was inside? Ye's No 
Tlicv saw %%hat was inside? Yes No 
Tlicy_fclt inside? Yes No 
7. AJohn-Told--Sally" 
,, 
Who knows what is inside the tunnel Sal1v or John? 1 
__Sally 
John 
.. 
B. Ilow do they know what is inside? Response 
C. Do they know what is inside because: _Thcv 
felt inside? Ves No 
I told them %%hat was inside? Yes No 
They saw what was inside? Yes No 
8. A. Sally Told "Sally" 
,, 
Who knows what is inside the tunnel Sally o John? Sally John 
B. How do they know w-hat is inside? Response 
C. Do they know what is inside because: They saw %%hat was inside? Yes No 
T'hey fq1t inside? Yes No 
I told them what was inside? Yes No 
9. A. Sally Seein "John" 
, 
Who knows what is inside the tunnel Sally o John? Sally John 
. 
13.1-low do they know what is inside? - Response 
C. Do they know what is inside because: They fc1t inside?? Yes No 
Thcv saw %%hat was inside Yes No 
I told them what was inside? Yes No 
1O. AJohn Feclin "John" 
, 
Who knows what is inside the tunnel. Sally rJohn? Sally John 
B. I-1ow do they know what is inside? Response 
C. Do, they know %%hat is inside because: They saw %%hat was inside? Yes No 
I told them what was inside? Yes No 
T`hcv fc1t inside? VC3 No 
1 I. A. John Told"John" 
Who knows what is inside the tunnel Saliv or John? Sallv John 
B. 1-low do they know %hat is inside? Response 
C. Do they know what is inside because: I told them what was inside? Yes No 
Thev saw %,. hat was inside? Yes No 
T'hey fc1t inside? Yes No 
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12. A. Sally Fcclin "John" 
Who knows what is Inside the tunncl. Sally or John? 
-% Sall John 
_13.1 
low do they know what is insidc? Response 
C. Do thcy know what is inside bccausc: 
_I 
told them %%hat was inside? Yes No 
11my fc1t insidc? N'eq No 
Ilicy saw%% hat was insidc? Yes No 
Tu%k3 Differentialion 
I. Can you licip John to scc %hat is inside the tunncl? Resp onse 
2. Can you hclp John to fccl uhat is insidc the tunncl? Res p onse 
3. Can vou tcll John what is insidc the tunncl? Res p onse 
4. Can you help John Fccl what is insidc the tunncl? Res p onse 
5. Can you tcll John what is insidc the tunncl? Rqp onse 
6. Can you liclp John to sce -*%Iiat is insidc the tunncl? Resp onse 
3-33 
APPENDIX 11 
Sprcad of scorcs across Task 2 
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative 
percent 
NAMING: 
Valid 3.00 1 1.8 1.8 1.8 
4.00 2 3.3 3.5 5.3 
5.00 2 3.3 3.3 8.8 
6.00 3 5.3 3.3 14.0 
7.00 5 8.8 8.8 22.8 
8.00 3 5.3 5.3 28.1 
9.00 2 3.3 3.3 31.6 
10.00 2 3.3 3.3 35.1 
11.00 4 7.0 7.0 42.1 
12.00 33 37.9 57.9 100.00 
Total 57 100.00 100.00 
SOURCE: 
. 00 9 15.8 15.8 15.8 
1.00 4 7.0 7.0 22.8 
3.00 2 3.5 3.3 26.3 
6.00 1 1.8 1.8 28.1 
7.00 1 1.8 1.8 29.8 
8.00 3 5.3 5.3 35.1 
9.00 3 5.3 5.3 40.4 
10.00 2 3.5 3.5 43.9 
11.00 5 8.8 8.8 52.6 
12.00 27 47.4 47.4 100.00 
Total 57 100.00 100.00 
1 
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APPENDIX III 
Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines 
Instructlohs for Contributors 
Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
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SECTION 4 
CRITICAL REVIEW 
Prepared in accordance with notes for contributors for. Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatty and Allied Disciplines 
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AUTISM AND THEORY OF MIND: AN EXAMINATION 014 
DIFFERENT MODALITIES 
Gcrrard Burrcll-Ilodgson and Chris I latton, Doctoratc in Clinical Psycholoa. Lnncastcr 
Univcrsity, Institutc for Health Rcscarch, Alcxandcr Squarc. Lancastcr 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper reviews in detail the study, assessing understanding inforniational nccess and 
knowledge fonnation in children with autism, nortnally developing children nnd those 
children with intellectual difficulties. Firstly, the research findings will be cxamincd in 
relation to other relevant studies. The uniqueness and spccificity of deficits in nutism will 
be considered, followed by discussion of the mcaning of task failure and the implication 
of modemtor variables. Methodological issues uill then be examined in the light of 
future research. Finally, consideration will be made as to the contribution that this study 
makes to the understanding of autism, and conclusions drn%%-n. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The research supports the h)T)othcsis that autistic individuals pcrform poorly compared to 
both nonnally developing and intellectually disabled groups on tmk-s assessing 'nicory of 
Mind (ToM; Premack and Woodruff, 1978). This rescarch cxtcnds prcvious work in 
demonstrating that deficits in understanding informational access and kno%vlcdgc appear 
tobecrossmodal. Thus, a significant number of participants %%itll autism lack 
understanding of the Seeing, Feeling and Tclling-Icads-to-kno%ving principle (Baron- 
Cohcn and Goodhart, 1994). Autistic childrcn's pcrfonnancc on singlc modalitics was 
consistent with the findings of previous studies such as Baron-Cohcn ct al. (1994), Leslie 
and Frith (1988) and Perner, Frith, Leslie and Lcekhmn (1989). 11ey found that about 
two thirds of children with autism seemed unable to understand the principle that to know 
something one has to have informational access to it. 'Mc performance of the non- 
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dcvclopmcntally dclaycd group was as prcdictcd by prcvious rcscarch-, almost all orti, csc 
childrcn passcd the tasks. 
Morcovcr, the rcsults clabomtc on the naturc of this difficulty. E%-cn %N-licn givcn a 
qucstion involving only thrcc vcry simpic aitcmativcs, overall pcrfamiance was 
substantially poorcr than that of the normally dcvcloping childrcn and thosc with 
intellectual difficulties. It %Nvuld have been possible for children to be correct using a 
simple strategy of answering the "'Ilow do they know? " question, by rcfcffing back to the 
event that had just happened, even without understanding the significancc of that cvcnt or 
its relation to the belief. Results would indicate that this was not the case. 
The results of this study are also consistent mith the pcrfonnancc by childrcn with autism 
on the Penny Hiding Game (Baron-Cohcn, 1992; OlIcndick and Oswald, 1989). Ilic 
errors made reveal a fundamental inability to understand the purpose of hiding - to 
occludc infonnation and notjust objects. More relevant to the present study, tlicy also 
reveal a failure to understand that a guesser %vill know the location of an objcct if they arc 
allowed to see where it is put. Ibis pattcrn of results also appears similar to the 
development of other ToM tasks involving misrcprcscntation, such as false belicf (Baron- 
Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985). Happe (1993) also found that impaircd ToNI ability %%-as 
associated with impaired comprehension of figurativc language. 
A developmental sequence has been proposed to cxplain some of these findings. 
Judgement of visual access is argued to be relatively casy bcouse it does not involve 
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undcrstanding of mcntal statcs, but only the judgemcnt of a physical rclation bct%%-ccii the 
other person's eyes and the object in the tunncl (Leslie ct al., 1988. llenicr, 1988). 
Attribution of knowlcdge ho%vcvcr is considcrcd morc difficult, bccausc the child has to 
understand how events in the real world (i. e. looking at sorncthing) cause a mcntal state 
of knowing (Wimmcr ct at., 1988). It is argucd that this undcrstanding of how cvcnts in 
the real world cause a mcntal state, is made particularly difficult irthe content of the 
mental state is non-rcal, as is the case of a false belief (Lcslic, 1988). *nic attribution of 
sccond-order falsc beliefs is even more difficult, because of the rccursivc naturc orsuch, 
attribution (Perner, 1988). It would, howcver, bc prcmaturc to arrivc at a conclusion in 
terms of the direction of the relationship bct%vccn understanding informational access and 
false belief, further studies are rcquircd. 
Uniqueness ofautism 
A second aim of this study %%-as to examine whether deficits, in understanding the role of 
informational access and knowledge are unique to autism. Ille performance of those with 
autism and thosewith intellectual difficulties confirm that the deficit in understanding 
informational access characterises individuals %ý, ith autism, but is not unique to autism. 
This is in line with research demonstrating weak mcntalising skills in othcr groups 
(Benson, Abbeduto, Short and Nuccio, 1993; Shields, Varicy, Broks and Simpson, 1996; 
Yirmiya and Shulman, 1996; Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi, Shulman and Pilo%,, iky, 1996). 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the higher scores of individuals with Down's 
syndrome on previous studies investigating ToNj, may indicate a speciric strcngth of 
those with Down's syndrome and not a deficit in those with autism. Individuals with 
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Down's syndromc arc known to havc highcr crnpathic abilitics and bettcr social skills. 
comparcd to othcr individuals with intclicctual difficultics of unknown actiology 
(Bccghly, Wciss-Pcrry, and Cicchctti, 1990; Kasari, Mundy, Yinniya, tuid Sigman, 1990). 
This has implications for future research and cmphasiscs the need for carcrul selection or 
control groups. 
A related issue and one that deserves further exploration, is the type orerrors made by a 
number of the children with autism. For example, instead of identifying how a doll knew 
what was in the tunnel, one child rcplicd "I think it is inside the tunnel". Additionally, 
another child attempted to guess what %%-as inside the tunnel -1 think it is a key". 
Therefore, it could be argued that similar or poor task performance bct%%-ccn the groups 
does not necessarily indicate similarities in the proccsscs undcrlying task performance. 
As has been suggested by other authors such as I lobson (1991), participants could be 
tackling the task in fundamentally different %%-a)s or additionally misinterpreting what %%-as 
expected of them and this is illustmted by a numbcr of the rcsponscs. 
What does task success andfailure actually mean? 
A further issue is the relationship between "normal" development of ToXI and ToXI in 
autism. A number of interventions have taught autistic children to pass tasks of false 
belief attribution. However, these children show little evidence of generalisation to othcr 
tasks in comparison to non-nally developing threc-ycar olds who could be traincd to pass 
the task and gencralise to other false belief tasks (McGrcgor, %Vhitcn and Blackburn, 
1998). A substantial proportion of autistic childrcn and non-nally devcloping tlir, --c-ycar 
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olds gcncrally fail on tcsts of faisc bclicf. Yct. tlircc-ycar olds arc not autistic, and adults 
with intellectual difficulties having a mental age ortlircc years do not nutomatically show 
the triad of impairmcnts. The diffcrcnccs b, (, t%%-ccn autistic individuals mid thrcc-)-car old 
childrcnhavc been cxplorcd by a number of rcscarchcrssuch as Iloth and Leslie (1991). 
From thesc studics it sccms that autistic childrcn and nornially dcvcloping thrcc-ycar olds 
fail ToM tasks for diffcrcnt rcasons, as only autistic childrcn %%-crc found to havc a 
specific problem with mcntal representations. I-liadorc, further work to delineate what 
ToM tasks measure is needed. Furthermore, given the debate surrounding the age or 
developing ToM abilities in nonnally developing children, the t)Tpc of task could be used 
in future studies as a potential moderator variable. Ile %%idc varicty of contcnts and 
contexts examined in the different tasks raises the possibility that the various tasks may 
not be testing the exact same abilities and that some arc casicr than othcrs. 
Moderator variables 
This study attempted to extend previous work by identifying the conditions under which 
performance on a task assessing understanding of informational access and knowledge 
may vary. As a result of the numbers passing and failing this task, statistical analysis was 
limited. However, logistic regressions did identify. associations between Group status 
(autistim and intellectual difficulties) as, %%-cll as the Tcst for Reception of Grammar 
(TROG; Bishop, 1983) and pcrforinancc. This is in line %%ith previous research indicating 
a relationship between ToM performance and verbal ability (Dah1grcn and Trillingsgaard, 
1996; Happe, 1995; Sparrevohn and Howie, 1995). Additionally, adopting a morc 
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conscrvative agc mngc of abovc four-ycars did not rcsull in markcdly improwd 
performance in the autism group, comparcd to the study or Baron-Cohcn ct al. (1994). 
PARTICIPANTS 
Recruitment of individuals with autism 
Recruitment of participants with autism proved problematic. Problcms first became 
evident during the pilot study (see Appcndix I and 11). Initially, the study intcndcd to 
recruit from one site. Ilowcvcr, despite discussion with thosc at the sitc and rcassuranccs 
of numbers fitting criteria, there were problems %vith insufficicnt diagnosis and varying 
use of diagnostic tools. Specifically, fewer participants than expected had actually been 
diagnosed as purely autistic according to DSN1 IV (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994) or ICD- 10 (World Health Organisation, 1994). Additionally, many children that 
had been diagnosed as autistic did not reach research criteria, in many cases not being 
verbal. Due to the difficulty in sourcing appropriate participants, the dccision was made 
to use children in the pilot study having a diagnosis of autistic spectrum disorder. As a 
result, this would not reduce the number of purely autistic individuals available for dic 
cxperimental sampIc. 
Numbers 
Despite these difficulties every cffort was made to obtain the number of autistic 
individuals recommended by the power calculations. This meant using ninc scparate sitcs 
overall for the autistic population. Unfortunately, numbers were still slightly rcduccd for 
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the autism group (n - 17). Ilowcvcr, studics such as Baron-Cohcn ct al. (1994) had lower 
(n = 12) or similar numbcrs (Lcslic ct al., 1988; n- 18). Largcr nunibcrs would. 
hoNvcvcr, cnabic grcatcr gcncmlisation of rcsults and allow ror fulicr cumination or 
potcntial modcrator variabIcs. Futurc studics should focus on diffcrcnt clinical groups 
and includc individuals of various abilitics %kithin cach group. 
Amount ofresearch interest 
The difficulty associatcd mith rccruiting and studying mrc s)-ndronics such as autism has 
implications for the intcrprctation of any findings. Many rcscarchcrs %%ho idcntiry well. 
matched groups of participants may administer several tasks to the same group, or 
differcnt rcscarchcrs usc the sarnc participants. Givcn dic potcntial for cxpcricnccs on 
other tasks to have an effect on present findings, the homogeneity orany group studied 
and the gencralisability of findings needs to be considcrcd during intcrprctation. Futurc 
studies could directly address this issue, considering intcr-group analyscs. ideally with 
larger samples. 
Measures 
The research measures chosen (TROG; and British Picture Vocabulary Scale; BPVS; 
Dunn, Dunn, Whetton and Pintilic, 1982) proved non-problcmatic to administer. 
moreover participants across the groups appeared to treat it as a guessing game and 
enjoyed it. During the design of the study, when the initial site m-as chosen for the autistic 
sample, scores on the Autism Diagnostic Intcrvicw-Rcviscd (ADI; Lord, Ruttcr. and Le 
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Coutcur, 1994) wcrc also to bc uscd. Unfortunatcly, dcspitc rcassuranccs to Ilic contrary, 
thcsc scores wcrc not gathered routinely and thcrcforc needed to bc abandoned. 
Despitc the Childhood Autism Rating Scalc (CARS; Schoplcr, Rcichler. Dcvcllis, and 
Daly, 1980) bcing shown to havc high rcliability and good validity (Trcvartlicn. Aitkcn, 
Papoudi and Robarts, 1996), its usc pro%, cd to bc problcmatic. Ibc CARS appcarcd 
clumsy and the categories %vcrc broad, cncompassing a numbcr or factors. Anumberor 
those conducting CARS assessments reported that the categories %%-crc in fact too broad, 
making appropriate selection problematic. This is supported by sonic orthe litcmturc. 
Howlin (1998) for cxamplc, statcd that: - Judgcmcnts bascd on clinical diagnosis may not 
ahmays agree NýJtljdipgnosis based on fonnal diagnostic criteria, such as the ADI or 
CARS" (p. 318). Despite these difficulties the CARS clearly differcntiatcd bct%N-cen those 
individuals *,. ith andwithout autism, although it should bc notcd that a numbcr of thosc 
receiving a diagnosis of autism fell slightly below threshold on the CARS. 1-his paper 
argues that this was an artefact of the measure as diagnosis was doublc-clicckcd. Other 
than improvements to the measure, future studies could use one clinician to diagnose and 
assess level of autism and use a further clinician for intcr-ratcr rcliability. Such measures 
were beyond the scope of this study. 
PROCEDURE 
The prior experience of the rcsearchcr working %vith individuals %vith autism proved 
invaluable. Given the need for routine and structure evident in many individuals %%ith 
autism, careful planning of the cxpcrimental session %vas vital. Ilicrcforc, discussion 
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with those involved with the childrcn cnsurcd that a time was sct aside that would not 
interfere with any set activities or other important routines. Moreover, the session %Nis 
placed in advance on the individual's tinictabic as a set activity and a familiar room was 
used. This gave the childrcn prior understanding of %vhcn it was going to be and 
approximatcly how long it %Nvuld last, tlicrcby maximising the chanccs of participation. 
FEEDBACK 
An important issue and one that was raised at the very beginning of the study %%Iicn 
institutions were contacted, was feedback. Institutions %vcre conccmed that in the past 
researchers had failed to fcedback findings to both institutions and otlicr interested 
parties. This they stated made both parents and staff reluctant to participatc in future 
studies. As a result each institution including other intcrcstcd parties such as parents, 
were offered the opportunity to attend a number of seminars aimed at disseminating the 
results of the research. It is hoped that this %%ill encourage participation in future studies 
and raise the profile of clinical psychology as a whole. 
THE CONTRIBUTION TO UNDERSTANDING 
This study contributcs to the undcrstanding of autism by cxtcnding prcvious. rcscarch and 
identifying that deficits in understanding informational acccss and knowledge arc cross- 
modal, and they can no longer be conccptualised as unique to autism. Findings suggest 
that comparison groups must bc carcfully cvaluatcd and tak-cn into account whcn 
interprcting data and infemng conclusions. Thcreforc, the common practisc of including 
individuals with Down's syndrome as a comparison group, referred to as individuals with 
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intclicctual difficultics is problcmatic. Additionally, including individuals with Do%%II'S 
syndromc and individuals with intclicctual difficultics rcsulting from othcr actiologics in 
onc comparison group, may also be qucstioncd. I'lic finding that individuals with 
intcllcctual difficultics and othcr disordcrs arc also impaircd in thcir ToXf abilitics docs 
not cxcludc the possibility that distinct clcnicn(s (cmpathy, various dimcnsions or 
cognitivc ability, social rclations, ctc. ) of this ability arc diffcrcntly impaircd in various 
groups of individuals. For cxample, studics of dcaf childrcn point to the importancc of 
social learning or of an acquircd c1cment in ToXI abilitics, %vhcrcas studics rcgarding 
individuals with intcllcctual difficultics point to the importancc orcognitivc facultics 
(Petcrson and Sicgal, 1995; Shulman and Pilowsky, 1996). By furthcr cxamining the 
ToM abilities of different clinical groups, %vc may enhance our understanding or its 
varying components and their origin. 
This research provides further information to inform general discussions of how best to 
cclucate individuals with autism. Popular sourccs of information on autism now includc 
references to ToM studies (Autism Research International, 1996). Temple Grandin 
(1995), a now famous individual %%ith autism, has suggcstcd that hcr mcthod ordcaling 
with impaired interpersonal skills involves compensating by replaying in her mind a 
videotape of images that she has collected in the course of her life time. It thmforc 
would appcar that thcrc arc %%2ys to ci rcumvcnt ToNt di M cul tics. Nforcoverscvcral 
intervention studies have found that children %%ith autism can show improvements in their 
ability to understand beliefs and motions (S%%vttcnham, 1995; Ozonoff and Miller, 1995; 
Hadwin, Baron-Cohcn, Ilowlin, and Hill, 1996). Some teaching materials arc cvcn being 
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markctcd with rcfcrcncc to ToNt (Gray, 1995). Not uncxpcctcdly, the gacralisition to 
untraincd aspccts of ToNt arc poor. Ncvcrtliclcss, cvcn this limitcd succcss suggcsts that 
I- 
training packagcs spccifically designcd to incrcasc social functioning could bc an 
important and valuabic addition to the cducational curriculum for many children with 
autism (flowlin, Baron-Cohen, I la&%in and S%%vttcnham, in press). Ilis paper does not 
suggest that an impairment in ToNt is unique to autism, or that it is the primary cause of 
autism, but rathcr that the idca of ToNt is a potcntially rich avcnue through %%hich to 
cxplorc cducational approachcs. 
CONCLUSION 
Rutter (1998) stated that research %%-as the lifcblood of clinical practicc in all fields or 
medicine, including child psychiatry. This is reflected, for cxarnple, in the growing 
ascendancy of "evidence-based medicine". Nevertheless, there arc dangers if individuals 
adopt too mechanical, and too simplistic, an interpretation of "cvidcncc-based medicine". 
This paper argues that the essence of research lies in the process of problem solving and 
not in the mcre provision of a set of factual ans%%vrs. Research can be vic%%-cd as telling 
stories about how mechanisms in nature might be operating. Following this, 
experimental-type strategies are used to test the ideas expressed in the stories to compare 
alternative explanations. Thereby, in gmdual, itcmtivc fashion one moves progressively 
to what might be the truth. The most important thing therefore, is not to know which of 
our current methods arc best, rattler to have a means of moving for%%-ard to develop cvcn 
better methods in the future. nat can only happen if the research is devised to dctcrTninc 
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what mcthods work in particular circumstaticcs, and not just wholicr thcy are bcttcr than 
aitcmativc approachcs. 
The investigations surrounding ToNt caught the rcscarch world's imagination as. for the 
first time, it provided a possible means of directly linking a cognitive deficit with a social 
problcm and that it did so in tcrms of an aspcct of cognition known to rollow a 
prcdictable developmcntal coursc. llowcvcr, a numbcr of problcnis rcmain to bc 
resolved. If the cognitive dcricit postulatcd to constitute the basis for autism is so narrow 
and highly speciflic, why is thcrc such a strong association bct%%rcn autism and gcncral 
intellectual difficulties (Rutter and Bailey, 1993)? Also, if a dcricit in ToNI is 
responsible, and yet is not seen to develop until the age of three or rour years, why arc the 
manifestations evident as early as twelve to cightecn montlis? Rutlcr (1999) suggcstcd 
that it could be that autism ariscs from cognitivc mcchanisms that arc prccursors of the 
mentalising ability. So far, however, it has not bccn possiblc to unambiguously 
demonstrate a causal relationship bct%%-ccn precursor and later ToNt skills. Additionally, 
the relationship between ToM skills and language has not yct bccn adcquatcly sortcd out. 
The two have been associated (Ilappc, 1995) but the mechanisms involved havc )-ct to be 
elucidated. Moreover, a percentage (around 20 - 30% in this study) of verbal children 
with autism pass tests aimed at assessing ToNt. It therefore remains unclear wlicther they 
truly have ToM skills or whether they use altcmative stratcgics to pass the tcsts. Finally, 
although it is not difficult to see how an impaired ability to understand other people's 
mental states might lead to social and communicative deficits associated %vith autism, it is 
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by no mcans c1car how it could givC risc to obscssivc prcoccupations and rcpctitive 
pattcms of bchaviour. 
To conclude, clinicians today rccognisc the need to take into account the associations 
bctwccn cducational difficultics, cognitivc dericits and psychopathology (Ruttcr, 1987) as 
wclI as childrcn's cxpericnccs at school and in the community. Clinical psychology has 
much to contribute to elucidating the processes involved in autism and the results of this 
study havc contributcd to the building and claboration of knowlcdgc and undcrstanding in 
the ficid of autism. 
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SECTION 5 
APPENDICES 
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APPENDIX I 
PRE PILOT 
In ordcr to bccomc fwniliar with the tcsting matcrials, timing and proccdurc a I'm Pilot 
tcst -*N-as carricd out %Nitli a six-ycar old (malc) nomially dcvcloping child. Twoscssions 
wcrc schcdulcd that cach lastcd approximatcly 25 mins cach. It bccanic opparcrit during 
testing that some minor alterations; %%vrc ncccssary bcrorc the pilot %%us conductcd (rcrcr 
to pilot propcr for cxact dctails): 
1. The number of experimental trials quoted in the original cthics proposal were 
incorrect at 15. As a rcsult, thcsc %%-crc adjusted accordingly to 12 (4 trials for 3 
conditions) for thc pilot. 
2. During the prc pilot it had also bccn notcd that cvcn aftcr the objccts wcre 
covered with the scarf that it was still possible for one to distinguish which object 
Nvas the ball. Thcrcforc, for the pilot the spoon and toothbrush %vcrc changcd for 
a kcy and a toy car. 
3. Additionally, during the pilot the proccdurc was aitcrcd to cnsurc that for cach 
condition (Secing, Fecling and Tclling) that the dolls actions u-cre similar to the 
doll being given access to what was in the tunnd. In the prc pilot Seeing trial, 
one doll liftcd up the flap and lookcd inside, the othcr doll %%-alkcd around looking 
at the tunncl. This was adjusted for the pilot to cnsurc that the other doll also 
touched the tunncl. In the prc pilot Feeling trial, one doll put their hand inside 
the tunncl while the other one lifted up the tunncl. For the pilot this %%-as uItcred 
so that the other doll merely touched the outside of the tunncl. 
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APPENDIX 11 
PILOT 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the pre pilotý a pilot test %s-as conductcd to ramiliarisc oncsclr%vitli both the 
materials and procedure, and to check if the experiment appeared to answer the research 
qucstion. This would bc a much smallcr tcst of the cxpcrimcnt propcr. using childrai 
from all of the intended groups. The pilot would provide dctailcd inrormation conccrning 
the feasibility of what %mas proposed in tcn-ns of time, effort and resources, specifically: 
1. Any difficulties involved in obtaining children matching the experimental critcria for 
each group. 
2. The practicality of working mith the diffcrent groups. For cx=plc, to dctcnninc how 
much time had to be spent %Nith children before the experiment, to familiarisc them %%ith 
the investigator. 
3. Usefulness and ease of application of each of the individual measures. 
4. The understandability of both the instructions and experimental tasks for the childrcn. 
S. If the experiment actually answers the research qucstion. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Included in the study were seven children with autistic tendencies (five boys, two girls), 
seven children with intellectual difficulties of undiffcrcntiatcd nctiology and without 
autism (rive boys, two girls), and scvcn normally developing childrcn (rive boys, two 
girls). All childrcn with autism attcnded spccial schools and %%-crc includcd in the study ir 
they had received a diagnosis by a clinician of autistic tcndcncics. I'lic participants with 
intellectual diflicultics attended one school for children ý%ith modcratc learning 
difficulties. The seven nonnally dc%, cloping children attending one of two Lml 
Authority infant schools. All participants had English as thcir first languagc. 
The inclusion criteria %vas a verbal mental age (VNIA) of between four and eight years. 
VMA was assessed using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, 
Whetton and Pintilie, 1982) and the Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG, - Bishop, 
1983). In addition, all children werc charactcrised by their scores on the Childhood 
Autism Rating Scale (CARS; Schoplcr, Rcichicr, Dcvcllis, and Daly, 1980), to cnsurc 
that normally developing individuals as well as those %%ith intclicctual difficultics did not 
meet the criterion for autism. See Table I for descriptive data. 
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Table 1. Participant Characteristics 
Verbal Nlcntal Age 
Diagnostic group N Gender Chronological Are TROG BlIvs CARS 
AUT 7 Male 5 Nican 
Female 2 S. D. 
Range 
ID 7 Male 5 Nican 
Fcmalc 2 S. D. 
Rangc 
IND 7 Male 5 NIcan 
Female 2 S. D. 
Range 
10.2 5.1 5.7 30.9 
2.3 0.5 0.8 6.2 
6.3-12.5 4.3-5.8 4.9-6.8 22.5-39.3 
9.2 31 3.4 16.3 
1.4 1.0 1.0 0.8 
7.5 - 11.0 4.3 - 7.0 4.3-6.3 16.0-19.0 
5.6 6.6 6.4 13.0 
0.4 1.1 1.4 0 
5.0-6.1 33-8.0 3.8-7.5 13.0-13.0 
Materials 
A "Toy tunnel" approximately 3 10 x 320 x 160 mm was constructcd and covcrcd %%ith 
matcrial. Both opcnings %vcrc covcrcd by flaps of matcrial. Two dolls %vcrc used, cach 
approximately 39 cm tall,,. %ith one mate (John) uith short black hair, and the other 
female (Sally) N%ith long blond hair. Three objects were used a key, a ball and a toy car. 
The objects were kcpt in a covered box, and when an object was tmnsfcrrcd to the tunncl 
it %,, -as covered by an opaque scarf. 
Procedure 
A mixcd quasi-cxpcrimcntal dcsign %vas cmplo)-ed; having both a bct%%-ccn-parti ci pants 
componcnt (Autism Vs ID Vs ND) and a %%ithin-participants; coniponcnt (modality or 
task). Thrcc cxpcrimcntal tasks %%-crc conductcd: 
Task (1): A prc-tcst, control condition. 
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Task (2) - split into two parts: 
a. Naming Question. To dctcrniinc anothcr's kno%vlcdgc 
b. Source Question. To idcntiry the source of that kno%vlcdge. 
Task (3): ldcntifying and diffcrcntiating the various componcnt nctivitics orsccing. 
fccling and listcning. 
All participants werc scrccncd by the invcstigator individually in a room without 
distractions at the schools conccmcd, prior to the cxpcrimcntal tasks. For both screcning 
and cxperimcntal testing the participant and investigator sat next to cach other at a table. 
No comments %vcrc made regarding the correctness or othcruise of responses. 
Task (1): pre-test control condition. A prc-tcst task familiariscd participants %%itil 111c 
general procedure of choosing one of the dolls and eliminated participants mho were 
unable to follow the simple procedure. First, the investigator took out two dolls and said 
to each participant: "This is John and this is Sally". 'I'lic participant was thcn askcd the 
naming question: "Which is John? Which Is Sally? " Ncxt participants %%-crc shown 
three objects and asked to name them. All participants passed these questions. I-hc 
invcstigator thcn said: "Let's give John the car and Sally a ball. " I faving watchcd the 
investigator give each doll an object, the participants were asked: "Who has the hall, 
John or Sally? " This last question constituted a control condition to the main 
experiment, reported below, in comprising a story but entailing no kno%vlcdgc formation. 
Six trials werc given to each participant, 'in which the object and order in which the dolls 
arc mentioncdvvcrc randomised across participants. Rcsponscs %%-crc rccordcd as Pass or 
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Fail. Again, all participants answcrcd corrcctly on all six trials and %vcre thcrcrorc 
pcnnittcd to participate in the sccond experimental task. 
Task (2): Parts a. and b. To determine another's knowledge and Identiry the source 
of that knowledge. The investigator introduccd tlIC cxpcdmcntal task to the participant 
by placing the tunnel on the table and saying: "Lookl This Is my tunncl, you can lift up 
the material and look inside. But when the material Is down you cannot see what Is 
inside. Now we are going to play a game. I am going to place things Inside the 
tunnel and then I am going to ask you which or the dolls Sally or John knows m-hat 
is inside the tunnel, and how they know what is inside? " The participants thcn 
receivcd 12 cxperimcntal trials, four for cach of the dirce I)Tpcs of sourcc inforniation 
(Seeing, Feeling and Telling). 
In the Seeing trial one of the objects was placcd into the tunncl using the scarf to prcvcnt 
the participant from sccing what %%-as inside the tunncl. The invcstigator thcn made one 
doll lift up the material and "look" inside, and the othcr doll walk around the tunnel 
looking at the outside. Each action was accompanied by a statcmcnt such as, "John lifts 
up the flap and has a look inside. Sally touches the tunnel and looks at the tunnel". 
The participant %%-as then asked "Who knows what is Inside the funncl John or Sally? " 
The child's response was again marked on the response shccL 
If the participant responded correctly to the idcntity of the doll thcy %%vrc thcn ask-cd the 
sourccqucstion. 11is was initially donc in the form of an opcn-cndcd clucstion: "llow do 
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they know what is inside"? If the participant responded immediately, they wcrc scored 
as either correct or incorrect. If the participant did not respond immcdiately, the source 
question was repeated and the participant presented with three forccd-choicc aitcmativcs 
that specified the different possible sources of information ("Because they felt inside, 
because they saw what was inside or because they were told what was Inside? "). I'lic 
three alternatives were presented separately and the participants rcquircd to respond 
"Yes" or "no" to each. The answers were counted as correct if responded to in the 
appropriate order. 
The Feeling trial was much the same, except the investigator made one of the dolls put a 
hand under the material and "feel" inside the tunnel, and the other doll lift up the tunnel 
and put it down again. Again each action %N-as followed by a statement such as: "Sally 
puts her hand inside the tunnel and takes it out again. John touches the tunnel". 
The Telling trial procedure %mas the same, except the investigator %vhispcrcd the idcntity 
of the object to one of the dolls, whereas the other doll %%-as whispered the time. Again 
each action was followed by a statement: "I am going to tell John what time it is. I am 
going to tell Sally what is inside the tunnel". 
On each of the trials the order of the doll that looks, feels or is told, versus the other 
actions of lifting up the tunnel etc. and the ordcr in which the two dolls are mentioned 
were randomised. Furthermore, the order of the forced choice alternatives were 
counterbalanced. This meant that the participant remained ignorant of the contents of the 
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tunnel, and therefore had to answer tile questions purely on the basis of what can be 
ascribed to another character. 
Participants received three individual scores (one for each condition) between 04 for the 
naming questions and three scores each between 04 for the source questions (regardless 
of either open-ended or forced choice fonnat). 
Task (3): Identifying and differentiating the various component activities of Seeing, 
Feeling and Telling. The materials for this task were identical to those described carlier. 
After completing the previous task the participants were asked if they would help John to 
play a game, by helping him to find out what is inside the tunnel. The investigator then 
placed one of the covered objects into the tunnel and the participant was told: "John 
wants to know what is inside the tunnel". This will be followed by one of three 
questions: "Can you help John to see what is inside the tunnel? " "Can you help 
John to feel what is inside the tunnel? ", or "Can you fell John what is inside the 
tunnel? " The procedure was repeated in order that each question was asked twice, there 
being six trials in total. The order of the questions again were counterbalanced. 
Individuals were scored as correct if. 
(i) in the "see case, " they lift up the tunnel or let John look under the material flaps. 
(ii) in the "feel case, " they put John's hand inside the tunnel. 
(iii) in the "Tell case, " they tell John the identity of the object in the tunnel. 
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RESULTS 
The results of the Naming Questions are prcscnted in Tables 2 and 3. It is c1car from this 
data that the autistic group performance was worse than both the childrcn with 
intellectual difficulties and normally developing children. Performance in the Telling 
condition was poorest with the autistic group scoring 11, compared to 24 for the children 
with learning dilliculties and 28 for the mainstream groups. 
Table 2. Number of trials passed for Naming Task. 
Disignostic group Seeing Feeling Telling 
AUT Trials Passed Frcq. Trials Passed Frcq. Trials Passed Frcq. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 5 
2 0 2 2 2 1 
3 4 3 3 3 0 
4 2 4 2 4 1 
Total Passed 21 Total Passed 19 Total Passed II 
ID Trials Passed Frcq. Trials Passed Frcq. Trials Passed Freq. 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 
2 0 2 0 2 0 
3 0 3 2 3 0 
4 6 4 5 4 6 
Total Passed 25 Total Passed 26 Total Passed 24 
ND Trials Passed Frcq. Trials Passed Frcq. Trials Passed Freq. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 0 2 0 2 0 
3 0 3 0 3 0 
4 7 4 7 4 7 
Total Passed 28 Total Passed 28 Total Passed 28 
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Table 3. Mean number of trials passed for Naming Task. 
Diagnostic group Seeing Feeling Telling 
AUT Mean 3.0 3. o 1.6 
S. D. 1.0 0.8 1.1 
Range 1.0-4.0 2.0-4.0 1-4.0 
ID Mean 3.6 3.7 3.4 
S. D. 1.1 0.5 1.5 
Range 1.0-4.0 lo-4.0 0-4.0 
ND Mean 4.0 4.0 4.0 
S. D 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Range 4.0-4.0 4.0-4.0 4.0-4.0 
The results from the Source task are presented in Tables 4 and 5. As can be seen, the 
autistic group did not pass any trials for either of the conditions. This is compared to 
scores of between 17 and 24 for the children with intellectual difficultics and 24 and 28 
for the normally developing children. Moreover, all children from the three groups were 
able to correctly answer the final Differentiation Task for all six trials. 
5-11 
Table 4. Number of trials passed for Source Task. 
Diagnostic group Seeing Feeling Telling 
AUT Trials Passed Frcq. Trials Passed Frcq. Trials Passed Frcq. 
0 7 0 7 0 7 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 0 2 0 2 0 
3 0 3 0 3 0 
4 0 4 0 4 0 
Total Passed 0 Total Passed 0 Total Passed 0 
ID Trials Passed Frcq. Trials Passed Frcq. Trials Passed Frcq. 
0 1 0 0 2 
1 0 1 1 0 
2 0 2 2 0 
3 0 3 2 3 0 
4 6 4 2 4 5 
Total Passed 24 Total Passed 17 Total Passed 20 
ND Trials Paswd Fmq. Trials Passcd Fmq. Trials Paswd rmq. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 0 2 1 2 0 
3 0 3 0 3 0 
4 7 4 6 4 7 
Total Passcd 28 Total Passcd 26 Total Passcd 28 
Table 5. Mean number of trials passed for Source Task. 
Diagnostic group Seeing Feeling Telling 
AUT Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 
S. D. 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Range 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 
ID Mean 3.4 2.4 2.9 
S. D. 1.5 1.5 2.0 
Range 0.0-4.0 0.0-4.0 0-4.0 
ND Mean 4.0 3.7 4.0 
S. D 0.0 0.8 0.0 
Range 4.0-4.0 2.0-4.0 4.0-4.0 
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DISCUSSION 
The results of the pilot were uscful in establishing that the cxperimcnt was fcasible and 
that it did appear to answer the research question. A number of points wcrc worth noting, 
actually getting hold of a large enough sample of children with autism to be included in 
both the pilot and the actual experiment, who matchcd the criteria, was problematic. 
Therefore, the decision was made to include in the pilot those with a diagnosis of autistic 
tendencies, so as not to reduce the experimental group numbers. Additionally, the 
amount of time needed to get to know the children from all groups prior to testing %%us 
minimal. Moreover, if presented with enthusiasm the children actually seemed to like 
seeing it as a guessing game. Testing took on average fifty minutes. The instructions did 
not appear to hold any problems, neither did the experimental tasks. What is more, 
preliminary descriptive analysis of the findings were of great interest, tentatively 
appearing to support the initial hypotheses. The decision NN-as made to continue with the 
experiment, taking into account the minor alterations identified in the pre-pilot. 
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